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REMITTITURS (AND ADDITURS)
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
AN EVALUATION WITH
SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVES
Irene Deaville Sann*
The use of remittitur and additur in American jurisprudence is based upon Jus-
tice Story's "very limits of the law" in conjunction with the constraints of the seventh
amendment This author states that since additur is not presently being used as a
procedural devise and remittitur is premised on the same principles, the current use of
remittitur should be eliminated
I. INTRODUCTION
AT THE CONCLUSION of a jury trial in a federal court, after
the jury has rendered its verdict, the parties are afforded an op-
portunity to make post-trial motions.' Such motions often include
a motion, by the verdict loser, for the entry of a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict,2 or, in the alternative, for a new trial.3 The
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New
York; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1977. The writer gratefully acknowledges
the substantial efforts of her secretary, Judy Caporale, and the contributions of her research
assistant, Catherine Allen.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); FED.
R. Civ. P. 59(a), (b) & (c) (motion for a new trial); FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (motion to alter or
amend a judgment). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (motion for relief from judgment based
on mistakes); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (motion for relief from judgment based on, inter alia,
mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a), (b) & (c). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (permitting joinder
of a new trial motion with a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or with
alternative motions); FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1) (requiring the trial judge who grants a judg-
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motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict4 is based on the
losing party's contention that no "reasonable jury" could have
found for the verdict winner on the strength of the evidence ad-
duced at trial; thus, as a matter of law, the verdict should be re-
versed through entry of a judgment favorable to the original loser.
Grounds for the new trial motion might include any of the follow-
ing, singly or in combination: errors at trial,6 jury misconduct, 7 im-
ment notwithstanding the verdict to also rule conditionally on any motion for a new trial);
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2) (permitting a "party whose verdict has been set aside on a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict" to serve a motion for a new trial). A party may
also move for a partial new trial, by which the party seeks redetermination only as to a
particular claim or a particular issue. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
A defendant who moves for a new trial on the ground that the jury award is excessive, see
infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text may also move, in the alternative, for a remittitur.
See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing the procedural device of remittitur);
see, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (D. Colo. 1985) (age
discrimination action); Flores Caraballo v. Lopez, 601 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.P.R. 1984) (civil
rights action for damages from false arrest, unlawful search, and use of excessive force);
Alaniz v. San Isidro Indep. School Dist., 589 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (civil rights
action for wrongful discharge); Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742, 744 (W.D.
La. 1983) (products liability action); Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 575 F.
Supp. 12, 13 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (employment discrimination action); Walker v. KFC Corp.,
515 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (breach of fiduciary obligation and constructive trust
action); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 508 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (personal
injury action); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134, 1134
(D.D.C. 1979) (personal injury action based on F.E.L.A.); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 1008, 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (state libel action and federal action under Fair Credit
Reporting Act); Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 614, 615 (D.
Colo. 1979) (patent infringement action); United States v. 534.28 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp.
82, 83 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (condemnation action); Mullins v. Seals, 416 F. Supp. 1098, 1099
(W.D. Va. 1976) (wrongful death action). In fact, in the great majority of cases in which a
defendant moves for a new trial on the ground of excessive jury verdict, he combines that
motion with an alternative motion for a remittitur. Even if the defendant does not move in
the alternative for a remittitur, however, a trial court may grant such relief. See infra notes
14-15 and accompanying text.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
5. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (overturning Missouri
Supreme Court's reversal of jury verdict, since evidence was sufficient to support verdict);
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
6. See, e.g., Westbrook v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1985)
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper argument by
plaintiff's counsel); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984)
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper speculation as
to decedent's future income); Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 530 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1976)
(requiring new trial because damages awarded plaintiff were excessive); Libco Corp. v.
Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1986) (Lexis, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (plain-
tiff's motion to revise the order granting a new trial was denied since the decision was not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law and facts).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Harry Barfield Co., 359 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1966) (revers-
ing denial of new trial on ground that, during a recess, juror had engaged in a friendly conver-
sation, unrelated to trial, with plaintiff); Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir.
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proper argument by opponent's counsel,8 admission of inadmissible
evidence, 9 and a verdict which is against the substantial weight of
the evidence.1" If the losing party is a defendant against whom the
1964) (reversing denial of new trial on ground that juror's answers to voir dire question which
they misunderstood led to harmful error because of inclusion on the jury of those jurors);
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947), cert denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947) (new trial on ground that jurors agreed to abide by majority votes because one juror
wished to return home to deal with a family emergency). See generally Comment, Impeach-
ment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. RFv. 360 (1958).
8. See, eg., Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1985)
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper argument by
plaintiff's counsel); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of
new trial where plaintiff's counsel appealed to jury to award sufficient damages to prevent
recurrence of errors on credit report); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewirt Sons', 624 F.2d 749
(6th Cir. 1980) (granting new trial because of continued references by plaintiff's counsel to
defendant's size and insurance coverage); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant,"
552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (setting aside verdict for plaintiff on grounds that plain-
tiff's counsel tampered with evidence transmitted to deliberating jury, unless plaintiff agreed
to remittitur).
9. See, eg., Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (granting
new trial on issue of damages where jury award was excessive and the product of passion and
prejudice).
10. See, eg., Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 263 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1959); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941); Balaska v. National Tea Co., 328 F. Supp.
147 (W.D. Pa. 1971). When a federal district court judge is deciding whether to grant a new
trial on the ground that the jury verdict is against the substantial weight of the evidence, he is
permitted to make his own evaluation of the credibility and significance of the evidence ad-
duced at trial. See, eg., Altrichter, 263 F.2d at 380. In making this decision, the judge acts
like a thirteenth juror, a person present at trial who is capable of evaluating demeanor evi-
dence and deciding whether the jury believed the wrong people. As stated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
Where there is substantial evidence in support of plaintiff's case, the judge may not
direct a verdict against him, even though he may not believe his evidence or may
think that the weight of the evidence is on the other side; for, under the constitu-
tional guaranty of trial by jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and pass upon
its credibility. He may, however, set aside a verdict supported by substantial evi-
dence where in his opinion it is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is
based upon evidence which is false ....
Garrison v. United States, 62 F.2d 41, 42 (4th Cir. 1932).
The position stated by the Fourth Circuit-that a district court judge cannot reverse the
jury by directing a verdict if he determines that, in his personal assessment, the jury verdict is
against the weight of the evidence because such an action would constitute an unconstitu-
tional reexamination of a "fact tried by a jury," U.S. CONST. amend. VII-has been articu-
lated and generally accepted by federal judges. See, eg., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265,
271 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J. concurring); Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 175 F.2d 498,
499-500 (5th Cir. 1949). These courts feel that the judge's only option would be to grant a
new trial of some or all of the issues in the case (pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure). Yet in 1880 the Supreme Court, in Bowditch v. Boston, announced a
seemingly different conclusion:
It is now a settled rule in the courts of the United States that whenever, in the trial
of a civil case, it is clear that the state of the evidence is such as not to warrant a
verdict for a party, and that if such a verdict were rendered the other party would
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jury has assessed money damages, the defendant might add exces-
siveness of the jury verdict to his list of reasons for moving for a
new trial.11 If the trial judge agrees that the jury verdict is exces-
sive, he may order a whole new trial12 or a partial new trial limited
to damage assessment issues. 13 Trial judges also utilize an alterna-
tive method for dealing with some excessive verdicts-the trial
judge calculates the amount of the verdict which he regards as ex-
cessive and then orders a conditional new trial (on some or all is-
sues), to be held if the plaintiff refuses to give up (remit) the amount
of the jury verdict deemed by the trial judge to be excessive. 4 This
be entitled to a new trial, it is the right and duty of the judge to direct the jury to
find according to the views of the court.
101 U.S. 16, 18 (1880). See generally, James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Control
Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961) (giving fuller treatment to this
issue). The impact of the seventh amendment on the device of remittitur is discussed below.
See infra notes 55-93 and accompanying text.
A district court judge whose assessment of the evidence presented in a case runs contrary
to that of the jury, as evidenced by its verdict, may grant a new trial on his own initiative,
even though neither party has made a post-trial motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d). Such grant
of power reflects a federal attitude that rendering judgments consistent with the evidence
adduced at a proper jury trial is more important than judicial economy. As noted below,
such an attitude is not necessarily reflected by use of the remittitur procedure. See infra notes
115, 119-20 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 32.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See, eg., Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant,"
552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See, e.g., Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 3
(E.D. Tenn. 1978).
14. The subsequent disposition of the following cases is not cited as authority for the
substantive issues in the text or footnotes, rather, the cases are meant to provide examples of
the language used by trial courts. The language and procedures of conditional new trial
orders rendered by federal trial courts vary in several regards. In some cases, the defendant's
new trial motion is granted conditioned on the plaintiff's subsequent refusal to remit the
excess. See, e.g., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983)
("[W]e grant a new trial on this issue.., unless plaintiff accepts a remittitur reducing the
award to $250,000"), rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Huebschen v.
Department of Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168, 1191 (W.D. Wis. 1982), ("IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for a new trial is GRANTED... unless
plaintiff agrees to accept $10,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive dam-
ages"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); Brink's Inc. v. City of New
York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("the motion for a new trial is granted unless
the City agrees to a remittitur .... ), aff'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("the $710,000 verdict is hereby set
aside as to the amount of damages and a new trial granted Conrail on that issue unless...
Morgan files... a remittitur of all damages in excess of $540,000 ...."); Uris v. Gurney's
Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Defendant's motion for a new trial is
granted . . . unless plaintiff . . . remits the amount of $200,000 .... ").
Other courts reverse the language, ordering that the defendant's motion for a new trial be
denied unless plaintiff refuses to remit. See, e.g., Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jackson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 83 F.R.D. 41, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, as is the motion for a new trial unless plaintiff declines
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to remit $95,000 of the $100,000 award of punitive damages"). See also Smith v. City of
Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 466 (E.D. Tex. 1985) ("[i]t is ... ORDERED that defend-
ants' Motion for New Trial be GRANTED on the following conditions: (1) If plaintiff agrees
to a reduction in actual and punitive damages of $200,000.00, then defendants' motion will be
DENIED . . ."). Other courts order entry of judgment in the remittitur-reduced amount,
with the provision that such order be vacated and a new trial had if the plaintiff objects to
entry of judgment in said amount. See, eg., United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d
722, 729 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[i]f... appellees consent to a remittitur of $169,934, the judgment
will stand affirmed as of the date of judgment from which appeal was taken... [but] [i]n the
absence of such remittitur, the district court will vacate its judgment and order a new trial");
Community Television Servs., v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.D. 1977) ("[I]t
will be ordered (1) that, if ... plaintiff ... shall serve . . . a remittitur in the sum of
$110,370.01 upon the verdict found.., the motion for a new trial be denied and the judgment
confirmed for the remaining sum; but (2) that if such remittitur ... be not so ... filed..., the
motion for a new trial be sustained, the judgment entered upon the verdict be vacated.., and
a new trial be granted"). See also Williams v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 430, 432
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("ORDERED . . . that a judgment in favor of Mr. Williams in the
amount of $150,000.00 and a judgment in favor of Mrs. Williams in the amount of $5,000.00
be awarded ... [i]n the event of rejection, a new trial is granted"). Still other courts post-
pone the matter of granting or denying a new trial motion, couching their orders in terms of
the plaintiff's behavior.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiffs file a statement... accepting the
remittitur of compensatory damages to $155,000 and of punitive damages to
$10,000, defendants' motion for new trial shall be regarded as denied as of the date
of such filing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if no statement is filed by plaintiffs, the
motion for new trial shall be regarded as granted as of the date of the expiration of
the time period within which a statement could have been filed, and the Court will
then set a new trial on the issue of damages only.
Strathmere v. Karavas, 100 F.R.D. 478, 479-80 (D. Ariz. 1984). See also Lux v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Defendant's motion for a new trial
will be denied if plaintiff agrees to remittitur of $1,000,000 .... Should plaintiff refuse
remittitur, defendant's motion for a new trial will be granted"), rev'd 803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1986).
The period of time within which the plaintiff who wishes to avoid a new trial must act on
the remittitur order varies, with time periods of ten (10) days (the shortest period for a trial
court's original order), see, eg., Strathmere v. Karavas, 100 F.R.D. 478, 479 (D. Ariz. 1984);
Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs.,
547 F. Supp. 1168, 1191 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.
1983); Brinks Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 717
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980); fifteen (15) days, see, eg., Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1206 (D.
Md. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 1191, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
838 (1981); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 579 (D. Md. 1975); twenty (20)
days, see, eg., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1986); Akermanis v.
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 44, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d
898 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984);
Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Collins v. Retail
Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 936 (E.D. Mich. 1976); and thirty (30) days, see, eg., Douglass
v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d
1128 (7th Cir. 1985); Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D 612, 619 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Lux v.
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procedural device is called a remittitur.15 If the plaintiff refuses to
remit, the case is submitted to a new jury without further action by
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Iil. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 803
F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986); Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1110 (D. Minn.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp.
80, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214,
218 (D.S.D. 1977); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744,747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), being
the standard time periods permitted. At least one court has given the plaintiff slightly more
than thirty days to respond, Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 466 (E.D. Tex.
1985), while upon denial of a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of a remittitur order, the
plaintiff was given only seven (7) days to respond. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp.
318, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985). It is clear
that, in some jurisdictions, such as the Southern District of New York, no single time period
is prescribed by court rules; the period allotted must depend upon the judge and the factual
circumstances of the case.
If the defendant has specifically requested a remittitur as alternative relief to a new trial,
the court might rule separately on the specific remittitur request. See, e.g., Holman v. Mark
Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1206 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986) ("OR-
DERED... [tihat the motion of defendant Patuxent Equipment Company for a partial new
trial on damages or for a remittitur, be... granted."); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578
F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D. Tex. 1983) ("it is... ORDERED... that defendants' motion ... for
remittitur or new trial is... GRANTED as to compensatory damages unless plaintiff accepts
remittitur of the compensatory damages to $12,500."); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp.,
487 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("The Court... grants a remittitur of $250,000...;
[tihe plaintiff shall have 10 days in which to accept... and if he falls to accept, a new trial is
granted."). See also supra note 3.
The language quoted below is an example of a plaintiff's written acceptance of a remitti-
tur order:
COMES NOW Plaintiff, LEWIS LEON HODGES, and, pursuant to the Court's
Memorandum and Order dated October 4, 1983, agrees to accept the remittitur of
compensatory damages to $12,500.00 expressly reserving any rights he may have to
object to this remittitur on appeal. In light of his acceptance of this remittitur,
Plaintiff moves that judgment in this case be made final.
Hodges, 578 F. Supp. at 625.
15. See, e.g., Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Cases, 12 DEF. L.J. 521 (1963); Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REv. 1
(1942); James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts, I DUQ. L. REV. 143
(1963); Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976) [here-
inafter Note, Remittitur Practice]; Comment, Additur and Remittitur in Federal and State
Courts: An Anomaly?, 3 CUM. L. REV. 150 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Additur and Re-
mittitur]; Note, Appealability of Judgments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal
Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150 [hereinafter Note, Appealability of Judgments]; Comment, Stat-
utory Authorization of Additur and Remittitur, 43 Miss. L.J. 107 (1972) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Statutory Authorization]; Comment, Appellate Remittitur, 33 Mo. L. REV. 637 (1968);
Comment, Remittitur Review: Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated and Unliqui-
dated Damage Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 376 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, Remittitur Re-
view]; Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial- Judicial Use of Additurs in Correcting
Insufficient Damage Verdicts, 21 VA. L. REV. 666 (1935) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional
Law]; Note, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's Intrusion on the Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 639 [hereinafter Note, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's In-
trusion]; Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J.
318 (1934) [hereinafter Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts].
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the trial court.16 If the plaintiff remits, the remittitur-reduced ver-
dict is entered, and the defendant does not get his new trial. 7
Under current practice, the remitting plaintiff cannot then appeal
the conditional new trial order. 8
This conditional new trial device-remittitur-has been em-
ployed by state' 9 as well as federalz° trial courts (and, in some cir-
cumstances, appellate courtsz l) for more than one hundred years, 2
and the use of remittitur has increased continuously to the present
day. 3 While the related conditional new trial device of additur-
grant of plaintiff's motion for a new trial conditioned on the defend-
ant's refusal to increase the jury verdict by the amount the trial
judge deems necessary to cure an inadequate verdict' 4-is employed
16. See supra notes 14-15.
17. See supra notes 14-15.
18. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., State v. Ferguson, 269 Ala. 44, 110 So. 2d 280 (1959); Grant v. Thomas,
254 Iowa 581, 118 N.W.2d 545 (1962); Slocum v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 190 Kan. 747,
378 P.2d 51 (1963); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R.R. Co., 244
Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Whitten v. Land, 188 So. 2d 246 (Miss. 1966); Jackson v.
Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 458, 349 P.2d 1029 (1960); Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
10 Wis.2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. 1960).
20. See, eg., Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Md. 1985); Smith v. City of
Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F.
Supp. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1986); Douglas v.
Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 1128
(1985); Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Md. 1984); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping
Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16
(E.D. Tenn. 1980); Fratelli Gardino, S.P.A. v. Carribean Lumber Co., 447 F. Supp. 1337
(S.D. Ga. 1978); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also
infra note 31.
21. See, eg., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss
Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d
Cir. 1984); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979). See also infra notes
149-62 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S.
397 (1896); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Clark v.
Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Arkansas Valley Land
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642
(1886); Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal. 487, 40 P. 798 (1895); Johnson v. Duncan, 16 S.E. 88 (Ga.
1892); Young v. Englehard & Silverberg, 2 Miss. 19 (1834); McAlister v. Mullanphy, 3 Mo.
25 (1831); Fry v. Stowers, 36 S.E. 482 (Va. 1900). The historical development of the remitti-
tur device is discussed below. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text.
23. See, eg., James, supra note 15, at 146 & n.16.
24. See, eg., Busch, supra note 15, at 551-58; Carlin, supra note 15, at 1-2; James, supra
note 15, at 14546; Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 299 n.2; Comment, Additur
and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 153-55; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra note 15, at
110-19; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 666-67; Comment, Correction of Damage
Verdicts, supra note 15, at 322-26.
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by some state courts,2 5 federal courts are prohibited from using ad-
ditur because the Supreme Court has ruled26 that the procedure vio-
lates the seventh amendment of the Constitution.2 7 Upon careful
examination, the virtues extolled in support of these conditional
new trial devices are generally reduced to economies of time, the
parties and the judicial system, and money.28 Trial judges usually
assert that if the only error in a jury verdict is the jury's excessive
generosity (in remittitur cases) or penuriousness (in additur cases),
the time, effort and money that went into getting that original jury
verdict could be saved by these simple devices.29
25. See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1967); James v. Morey, 44 Ill. 352 (1867); Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866); Marsh v.
Kendall, 65 Kan. 48, 68 P. 1070 (1902); Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854
(1957); Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970); Fisch v. Manger,
24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d 815 (1957); O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883
(1956); Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958); Claising v. Kershaw, 224 P.
573, 129 Wash. 67 (1924).
26. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See also infra notes 56-93 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See infra notes 56-93 and accompanying text.
28. See, eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 3-4 ("[t]he desirability of [remittitur's] use, to
avoid the expense, delay and prolongation of litigation incident to a new trial, would seem to
be beyond controversy"); Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 160
("[r]emittitur and additur have developed through the years to help alleviate the situation of
crowded dockets brought about by the necessity of new trials on the issue of excessive or
inadequate jury awards"); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 318
("efficiency of judicial administration is hampered by the granting of new trials, with their
concomitant delays in final adjudication and increased costs to litigants"). Clearly, with an
overburdened judicial system, avoidance of unnecessary new trials is a desirable goal. How-
ever, current remittitur practice is not the fairest method for achieving this goal, and this
Article suggests alternative methods for reducing the potential for excessive verdicts without
acting on such verdicts. See infra notes 166-263 and accompanying text.
29. See, Lewis v. Elliott, 628 F. Supp. 512, 524 (D.D.C. 1986) (court orders new trial
conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of compensatory damages, stating, "[t]he
Court concludes that the jury's damage award exceeded the maximum limit ... [and]
[a]ccordingly, a remittitur is appropriate .... ); Holman v. Mark Indus., Inc., 610 F. Supp.
1195, 1206 (D. Md. 1985) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit
part of compensatory damages and damages for loss of consortium, stating, "[tihe principle
of remittitur is ancillary to the right of a trial judge to grant a new trial, and a remittitur may
be assessed in an amount that will bring the verdict on damages to the maximum amount
which the jury could have awarded under the evidence introduced at trial"); Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 821-22 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769
F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit
part of award of punitive damages, stating, "$1,500,000 in punitive damages.., far exceeds
the necessary and permissible level.. .[;J $100,000 ... is a reasonable amount... [and] [t]he
Court ... will grant Hustler's motion for a new trial unless Douglass agrees to remittitur.
..."); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (court
orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of award of compensatory
damages, stating, "[w]hen a motion for new trial is premised on the issue of excessive dam-
ages, the court may, if the verdict is not judged to have been the result of the jury's passion or
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Although the frequency of use of these devices varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction,3" the remittitur device has been and contin-
ues to be employed in every federal circuit,31 and most state courts
prejudice, offer the plaintiff the options of new trial or remittitur"); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co.,
569 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 (D. Colo. 1983) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's
refusal to remit part of award of punitive damages, stating, "[h]ad the entire trial been tainted
[by jury passion or prejudice], the Court would have no choice but to order a new trial... [,]
but finding no defect in the liability determination], the Court will order a remittitur.. .. ),
rey'd, 785 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1986) (on ground that district court erred in denying
defendants' motions for a directed verdict on issue of punitive damages and in submitting this
issue to the jury); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp.
64, 103 (D.S.C 1979) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of
award of actual damages, stating, "[t]he practice of remittitur... allows a court to condition
denial of a motion for a new trial upon plaintiff filing a remittitur in a stated amount"); Jehl v.
S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 994-95, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 282-83 (1967) (court adopts additur as a
method for achieving "economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings" by which trial court
can order new trial conditioned on defendant's refusal to increase the jury verdict to a court-
fixed amount); Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957) (court adopts
additur); O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956) (court adopts ad-
ditur); Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958) (court adopts additur). The
issue of jury passion or prejudice as affecting a court's decision to grant a remittitur will be
discussed below. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
Other courts make conditional new trial orders without discussing the benefits or bases of
these orders. See, eg., Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 466 (E.D. Tex. 1985)
(court finds actual damage award "could not have exceeded $50,000.00" and then, without
discussion of the basis for, or the propriety of remittitur, orders a new trial conditioned on
plaintiff's refusal to remit); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (court finds compensatory damage award excessive and, after stating "that a remittitur
of $1,000,000 is appropriate," enters a conditional new trial order), rev'd, 803 F.2d 304 (7th
Cir. 1986) (on grounds that evidence of decedent's income tax liability was not allowed by
district court and would have altered size of pecuniary damage amount awarded by jury);
Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (court finds
amount of compensatory damages over $1,000,000 to be excessive and, without further dis-
cussion, "grants a remittitur of $250,000, which will reduce the verdict to $1,000,000").
30. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text. Some federal jurisdictions have less
rigorous requirements than do other jurisdictions for use of remittitur. Moreover, some fed-
eral circuits, such as the Second and Fifth Circuits, decide many more cases involving remit-
titur requests or orders than do other circuits, such as the First, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
See infra note 31. The additur device is not employed by federal courts. See infra notes 56-
93 and accompanying text.
Most states employ remittitur to some extent, but not all states employ additur. See gen-
erally, Busch, supra note 15; Carlin, supra note 15; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra
note 15; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15; Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts,
supra note 15.
31. First Circuit: See, eg., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982); Fact
Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980).
Second Circuit: See, eg., Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984);
Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982); Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d
519 (2d Cir. 1976); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d. Cir. 1982); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509
F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191
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(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Garzelli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, 419 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y 1975).
Third Circuit: See, e.g., Walters v. Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985); Kazan v.
Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1983); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318 (E.D.
Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985); Marsh v. Interstate & Ocean
Transp. Co., 521 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Del. 1981); Schrefller v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp.
1300 (D. Del. 1981); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1980);
Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Keystone Floor Prods. Co. v. Beat-
tie Mfg., 432 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.Pa. 1977); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
Fourth Circuit: See, e.g., Martin v. Fleissner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1984); Das-
karolis v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1981); Holman v. Mark
Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986); Korotki v.
Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Md. 1984); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B.
Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Call
Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 544 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
Fifth Circuit: See, e.g., Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986); Enterprise
Ref. Co. v. Sector Ref., Inc., 781 F.2d 1116 (1986); Giancontieri v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Haley
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 741 F.2d 87 (1984); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 722 F.2d 1238 (5th
Cir. 1984), modified, 727 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1984); Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co.,
718 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983); Higgins v. Smith Int'l, 716 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1983); Sam's
Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1982); Carlton v. H.C.
Price Co., 640 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981); Keyes v. Lauga, 635 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1981); Geyer
v. Vargas Prods., Inc., 627 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1980); Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d
1373 (5th Cir. 1980); Miles v. Vicksburg Chem. Co., 588 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1979); Wester-
man v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978); Adams v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 556 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1976); Villar v. Wilco Truck Rentals, 627 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. La. 1986); Smith v. City of
Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F.
Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. La.
1983); Faulkner v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
Sixth Circuit: See, e.g., American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417
(6th Cir. 1984); Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); Smith v. John Swafford Furniture Co., 614 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Witten-
berg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.
Ohio 1983), modified, 787 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 585 (1986); Wil-
liams v. Ryder Truck Lines, 489 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Collins v. Retail Credit Co.,
410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
Seventh Circuit: See, e.g., Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985);
Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978); Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale &
Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Lux v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 304
(7th Cir. 1986); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. II1. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1489 (1976); Plattner v.
Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social
Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.
1983).
Eighth Circuit: See, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1635 (1986); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.), cert de-
[Vol. 38:157
REMI7TITURS (AND ADDITURS)
use one or both devices.32 Moreover, the versatility of the devices is
demonstrated by the wide variety of cases in which they have been
used, including tort cases, 33 contract cases, 34 civil rights actions,35
nied, 106 S. Ct. 233 (1985); Smith v. Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1984); Vanskike v.
Union Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1984).- Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 716
F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983); Everett v. S.H. Parks & Assocs., 697 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1983);
Central Microfilm Serv. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 104 (1983); United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land,
674 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1982); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1981);
Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980);
Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1979); Richardson v. Communications Workers
of Am., 530 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Bankers Life & Casualty v.
Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D.
Mo. 1983), modified, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Dick
v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Minn. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d
939 (8th Cir. 1984); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec., 508 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd,
669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983).
Ninth Circuit: See, eg., 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985). Cf Walker v.
KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (trial court refuses to grant remittitur), modi-
fied, 728 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1984); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(trial court refuses to grant remittitur).
Tenth Circuit: See, e.g., K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir.
1985); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 785
F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1986). Cf. Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1980) (court refuses
to grant remittitur); Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, 563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977)
(court refuses to grant remittitur); Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546 (D.
Colo. 1985) (court refuses to grant remittitur).
Eleventh Circuit: See, eg., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.
1985); T.D.S., Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Taylor,
733 F.2d 1539 (1lth Cir. 1984); Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (11th Cir.
1983); Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253 (11th Cir. 1983); Warren v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
District of Columbia Circuit: See Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 305, 24 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 31,385 at 18,292 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980) (motion
for remittitur denied); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134
(D.D.C. 1979) (court refuses to grant remittitur).
32. See supra note 19. See generally, Busch, supra note 15; Carlin, supra note 15; Com-
ment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra note
15; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15; Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra
note 15.
33. See, e.g., Walters v. Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985) (wrongful death action
by survivors of decedent killed in accident at place of employment); Hansen v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (wrongful death action by survivors of
decedent who allegedly died from employment-related exposure to asbestos products);
Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Md. 1985) (personal injury and loss of con-
sortium suit arising from accident at place of employment), aff'd; 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir.
1986); Faulkner v. Western Elec. Co., 98 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (action for physical
and emotional injuries allegedly sustained because of a neck injury); Starlings v. Ski
Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (personal injury action arising from
skiing accident); Uris v. Gurney's Inn. Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (personal
injury and loss of consortium action arising from dune buggy accident).
34. See, eg., Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th cir. 1978) (action for
fraud and breach of express and implied warranties against housing contractor); Geyer v.
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eminent domain proceedings,36 and antitrust actions.37  Basically,
any jury trial at which money damages can be awarded is a poten-
tial candidate for a conditional new trial order.
Enthusiastic adoption of remittitur, however, has not com-
pletely dispelled doubts about the constitutionality of its use by the
federal courts.38  Moreover, many commentators 39  question
whether the distinctions drawn by the Supreme Court between re-
mittitur (as constitutional) and additur (as unconstitutional) are re-
ally sound in historical as well as practical terms.' Some believe
Vargas Prods., 627 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1980) (action for breach of employment contract);
Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (action for breach of warranty in
sale of flat-bed truck); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982) (action for breach of contract and breach of implied
warranty of title in sale of painting); Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(action for wrongful termination of oral employment contract); Keystone Floor Prods. Co. v.
Beattie Mfg., 432 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (action for breach of distributorship agree-
ment); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (action for breach of
employment contract).
35. Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985) (civil rights action against city and
former mayor for damages arising from arrest of plaintiffs); Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771
F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights action against city for damages arising from strip
search of plaintiff); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (civil
rights action against city and police officers for injuries sustained in engagement with police
when plaintiff's automobile was stopped by police to determine whether plaintiff was intoxi-
cated); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wisc.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (civil rights action for sexual
harassment of plaintiff in his place of employment); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 508
F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080
(1982) (civil rights action for age discrimination in employment).
36. See United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1982) (action for
just compensation in eminent domain case).
37. See, e.g., Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1977) (antitrust action by automobile
dealers against automobile manufacturer and some of its wholly owned subsidiaries), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(antitrust suit brought by independent automobile dealer and its major stockholders against
automobile manufacturer), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 868 (1974).
38. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Carlin, supra note 15, at 29 (The functional application of additur and
remittitur rests upon the distinction between what the jury "may" award and what "ought"
to be awarded. Use of the term "may" allows some element of discretion to be exercised by
the judge.); Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 163 (No credible rationale
exists for the general acceptability of remittitur while the equally effective additur has been
roundly dismissed.); Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 673-74 (distinction between
remittitur and additur is unsound in view of the laudable ends served by the application of
each); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 324 (argument that use of
additur should be declared constitutional despite possible seventh amendment problems).
40. See infra notes 56-93 and accompanying text.
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that both procedures should be endorsed and utilized,4 1 while
others question the constitutionality of either.42 Finally, some com-
mentators question whether any benefits provided by the condi-
tional new trial procedures are not outweighed by considerations in
other than potential constitutional conflict.4 3
The purpose of this Article is to explore the efficacy and consti-
tutionality of the remittitur device,' with some consideration of
whether additur should be included in the already extensive arsenal
of the federal trial judge.4" Discussion will focus almost exclusively
on the federal courts because state courts do not face the chimera of
seventh amendment limitations on reexaminations of jury ver-
dicts.46 The evaluation will include not only examination of trial
court remittitur practice,47 but also the effects of its use by appellate
courts.4" Finally, the Article will suggest alternative methods49
which might achieve some of the asserted benefits of the conditional
new trial device absent some of the unfairness and inefficiency, as
well as the usurpation of the jury function, which are currently em-
ployed in the device.5"
II. DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONAL
NEW TRIAL ORDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Development
Authorities agree that the use in the United States federal courts
of the remittitur procedure was initiated by Mr. Justice Story, while
sitting on circuit, in the case of Blunt v. Little." In a single para-
graph devoted to the issue of excessive damages, in which the sole
41. See, eg., Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 673-74; Comment, Correction
of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 324.
42. See, ag., Carlin, supra note 15, at 36-37.
43. See generally Busch, supra note 15. See also infra notes 166-247 and accompanying
text.
44. See infra notes 166-247 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 248.
46. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 94-148 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 166-247 and accompanying text.
51. 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578). See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheidt,
293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1885); Note
Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 300-01; Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note
15, at 151-52; Note, Appealability of Judgments, supra note 15, at 1158 n.61; Comment, Stat-
utory Authorization, supra note 15, at 107-08; Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note 15, at
376 n. 1; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 667; Note, Procedures to Lessen Remitti-
tur's Intrusion, supra note 15, at 642-43.
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authorities cited were two English cases upholding a judge's author-
ity to grant a new trial on the grounds of excessiveness of the jury
verdict, Justice Story approved of and used the remittitur device.5 2
I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict,
and in so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law.
After full reflection, I am of opinion, that it is reasonable, that
the cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the plaintiff
is willing to remit $500 of his damages. If he does, the court
ought not to interfere further.5 3
Although referring to "the very limits of the law," Justice Story did
not mention the possible source of such limits, that is the seventh
amendment of the Constitution, which proscribes any reexamina-
tion of a "fact tried by a jury"-in remittitur cases, the jury's assess-
ment of the proper amount of damages-"otherwise . . . than
according to the rules of the common law."
54
In only a handful of cases55 has the United States Supreme
52. 3 F. Cas. at 761-62.
53. 3 F. Cas. at 762 (emphasis added).
54. See infra note 58.
55. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping, 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (question whether a plaintiff
may appeal from a remittitur order which he has accepted); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S.
77 (1955) (question whether, on the records of this case, district court's denial of a new trial
upon plaintiff's remitting excessive part of verdict should have been disturbed by the court of
appeals); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (question whether a federal court could
constitutionally employ the additur procedure; dictum as to possible unconstitutionality of
the remittitur procedure); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917) (question whether
plaintiff who had accepted an appellate remittitur could appeal the remittitur order); Gila
Valley, G & N Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914) (question whether the large amount remitted
in an unliquidated damage case established passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, thus
requiring a new trial rather than remittitur); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307
(1911) (did not directly address remittitur practice but tacitly approved use of appellate re-
mittitur); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896) (question whether, upon finding that a lower
court judgment was valid except for certain damages awarded because of improper jury in-
struction, the Court could order remittitur); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co.,
158 U.S. 41 (1895) (question whether plaintiff who had accepted an appellate remittitur order
could appeal the remittitur order); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894) (question whether a
plaintiff who had accepted a remittitur under a new trial-remittitur order, made at a time
when the trial judge could no longer grant a new trial, could appeal the remittitur order more
than two years after his acceptance of the order); Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892) (ques-
tion whether order of remittitur was appropriate); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889)
(question whether a federal appellate court could enter judgment absolutely, for an amount
less than that awarded by the jury, without the plaintiff's agreement); Arkansas Valley Land
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889) (question whether remittitur denied the defendant
his rights under the seventh amendment); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642
(1885) (question whether it was error for a trial court to order a new trial unless the plaintiff
agreed to remit the amount the court determined to be excessive). See also Fairmount Glass
Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933) (question whether Supreme Court would
review appellate court's grant of a new trial when such grant was conditioned on the parties
not agreeing to entry of an increased verdict); Minneapolis, St. P & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin,
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Court dealt with issues relating to the question of federal court new
trial orders conditioned on a party's refusal to accept a court-re-
duced or court-increased verdict-remittitur or additur. Its most
famous (and most direct) decision involving these procedures was
Dimick v. Schiedt,56 a 1935 opinion in which the Court, per Mr.
Justice Sutherland, in a 5-4 decision,57 concluded that additur could
not be utilized by federal courts because the procedure involved an
unconstitutional reexamination of a jury verdict in violation of the
283 U.S. 520 (1931) (question whether a state court in a F.E.L.A. action, could use remittitur
to cure an excessive verdict where the excessiveness of the verdict was a product of passion
and prejudice).
56. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). Arguably, in other cases, the Supreme Court implicitly or
explicitly approved the remittitur procedure. See supra note 51. Those cases, however, in-
cluded little or no analysis. For example, the earliest case in which the Supreme Court ap-
proved remittitur, Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886), included only the
following discussion of the issue:
The exaction, as a condition of refusing a new trial, that the plaintiff should
remit a portion of the amount awarded by the verdict was a matter within the
discretion of the court. It held that the amount found was excessive, but that no
error had been committed on the trial. In requiring the remission of what was
deemed excessive it did nothing more than require the relinquishment of so much of
the damages as, in its opinion, the jury had improperly awarded. The corrected
verdict could, therefore, be properly allowed to stand. Hayden v. The Florence Sew-
ing Machine Co., 54 N.Y. 221, 225 (1873); Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208, 213 [93
Am. Dec. 80, 87 (1867); Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason, 102, 107.
116 U.S. at 646-47 (emphasis in original). This language, which is conclusory and which, for
support, relies on two state court cases and one federal circuit court case (decided by Mr.
Justice Story while sitting on circuit), is often cited for the proposition that the Supreme
Court had approved remittitur at an early date. See, eg., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
483 (1935); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 73 (1889). The only
case before Dimick in which the Court addressed the seventh amendment issue was Arkansas
Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 72 (1889). See infra note 58. The Court's
assessment of the defendant's allegation that the remittitur "is in effect a re-examination by
the court, in a mode not known at the common law, of facts tried by the jury," 130 U.S. at 72,
consisted of the following analysis:
The practice which this court approved in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Herbert
is sustained by sound reason, and does not, in any just sense, impair the constitu-
tional right of trial by jury. It cannot be disputed that the court is within the limits
of its authority when it sets aside the verdict of the jury and grants a new trial where
the damages are palpably or outrageously excessive. But, in considering whether a
new trial should be granted upon that ground, the court necessarily determines, in
its own mind, whether a verdict for a given amount would be liable to the objection
that it was excessive. The authority of the court to determine whether the damages
are excessive implies authority to determine when they are not of that character.
To indicate, before passing upon the motion for a new trial, its opinion that the
damages are excessive, and to require a plaintiff to submit to a new trial, unless, by
remitting a part of the verdict, he removes that objection, certainly does not deprive
the defendant of any right, or give him any cause for complaint.
Id. at 74 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
57. Justices Butler, McReynolds, Roberts, and Van Devanterjoined Mr. Justice Suther-
land in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo joined
in a dissent written by Mr. Justice Stone.
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seventh amendment. 8 After a review of what it considered to be
relevant historical data, the only review of such materials conducted
by the Supreme Court in regard to the question of the constitution-
ality of remittitur, the Court concluded:
59
In the last analysis, the sole support for the decisions of this
court..., as far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in
hand, must rest upon the practice of some of the English
judges-a practice which has been condemned as opposed to the
principles of the common law by every reasoned English deci-
sion, both before and after the adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion, which we have been able to find.
In the next paragraph, in rather startling dictum, the Court went on
to note:
60
In the light reflected by the foregoing review of the English deci-
sions and commentators, it, therefore, may be that if the question
of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would be
58. 293 U.S. at 486. The seventh amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. While sometimes misinterpreted as prohibiting any reexamination
of a fact tried by a jury, the generally accepted interpretation of the seventh amendment is
that (1) it requires federal courts to afford jury trials in circumstances in which such trials
would have been available in England at the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment
in 1791, and (2) it forbids federal courts from reexamining the fact-finding of a jury, except as
such reexamination would have been available in England at the time of the adoption of the
seventh amendment. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: CIVIL § 2303 (1971); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). The additur and remittitur procedures compromise the
seventh amendment proscription against unlimited reexaminations of facts found by a jury.
When a trial judge (or, possibly, an appellate judge) concludes that the jury verdict is exces-
sive (or inadequate) by $X, one must necessarily ask whether the judge's action in condition-
ing a new trial order on the plaintiff's refusal to agree to accept a verdict of SX less than the
jury awarded (or on the defendant's refusal to agree to increase the verdict to $X more than
the jury awarded) involves such a prohibited reexamination of a fact found by a jury (the
amount of damages to which the recovering party is entitled). In effect, the trial judge (or
appellate judge) is substituting his own evaluation of the appropriate quantum of damages for
that found by the jury by granting a remittitur (or additur), rather than merely granting a
new trial on the ground of excessiveness (or inadequacy) of the jury verdict. If an uncondi-
tional new trial is granted, the determination of damages is relegated to a new jury rather
than, arguably, the usurpation of a judge. If, however, it could be established that similar
reexaminations of facts found by a jury were sanctioned at the common law, remittitur and
additur practice would not violate the seventh amendment, and no other Constitutional bar-
rier would stand in the way of adopting of these procedures. Thus, the Court in Dimick
embarked on a lengthy historical evaluation of practices at the common law in 1791. 293
U.S. at 477-84. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone also included extensive historical
analysis. 293 U.S. at 490-98.
59. Id. at 484.
60. Id. at 484-85.
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decided otherwise. But... the doctrine has been accepted as the
law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied in the
federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some support in
the practice of the English courts prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, we may assume that in a case involving a remitti-
tur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsid-
ered or disturbed at this late day.
Thereafter, the court further referred to the general federal accept-
ance of remittitur as a "doubtful precedent" that should "not [be]
extended by mere analogy" to additur.6 1 This grudging acceptance
of the remittitur procedure, using only an "estoppel" or "tradition"
argument to meet, at least in part, what the majority considered to
be rather compelling evidence of unconstitutionality, seems like a
rather rocky foundation on which to continue a procedure which
has, in recent years, proliferated in the federal courts.6 2 Although
the question of remittitur was not directly before the court in Di-
mick, the Supreme Court has never again questioned the use of the
remittitur procedure by federal courts. 63 In other words, a proce-
dural device of relative importance in the federal courts received its
constitutional imprimatur in dictum and on the basis of a faulty
argument. If the procedure is unconstitutional, tradition or prece-
dent cannot make it constitutional nor allow the procedure to con-
tinue once its constitutional defect has been identified. In 1938,
after approximately one hundred years of "tradition," the Supreme
Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' reversed the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson.6 This reversal was compelled by "the unconstitu-
61. Id. at 485.
62. Recently, thousands of federal court defendants have, almost as a matter of course,
made motions for the alternative relief of remittitur or new trial based on the excessiveness of
the damages awarded by juries. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. It is doubtful
whether a procedural device extolled as accomplishing economies of time, effort and money
can really achieve these admirable ends when it has become the subject of an automatic post-
trial motion rather than an extraordinary device to be employed in special circumstances. It
is also doubtful, as noted in the text, whether such a prevalent procedure should be grounded
on what may be considered to be questionable analytical grounds.
63. In the few post-1935 cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt with remittitur-
related issues, the propriety of the basic procedure has been assumed by the Court. See Don-
ovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (In deciding whether a plaintiff could appeal
from a remittitur order he had already accepted the court did not question the fact that the
role of the courts in the federal system in reviewing a jury verdict was a matter of federal
law.); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955) (the Supreme Court stated that the court of
appeals was not justified in regarding the denial of a new trial, upon remittitur of part of the
verdict, as an abuse of discretion, thus implicitly accepting the procedure).
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Story,
construed the Rules of Decision Act to require federal courts which were vindicating state-
created rights to apply "the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof
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tionality of the course pursued,"66 rather than prevented by ideas of
tradition and precedent. This action amply illustrates the bank-
ruptcy of the "tradition" argument made in Dimick.6
Dimick includes, however, more than just tacit approval of re-
mittitur because of its tradition of acceptance. The Court also dis-
tinguished remittitur from additur in several regards, thereby
buttressing its position that one procedure might be accepted while
the other was rejected. First, the Court noted that an arguable, al-
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality"
but to not require that such federal courts follow the general case law of the state. 41 U.S. at
18. Thus, federal courts were free to fashion their own general federal law to "questions of a
... general nature ... as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other
written instruments and especially to questions of general commercial law .. ." Id. at 18-19.
In Erie, the Supreme Court "disapproved" the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, arguing that
Swift permitted an unconstitutional usurpation of state functions by federal courts. The
Court concluded that "[t]here is no federal general common law" and that federal courts
would hereforth be required to follow state substantive law, as declared by the courts of the
state, when these federal courts were vindicating state-created rights. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
66. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
67. In Erie, the Supreme Court noted: "If only a question of statutory construction
were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied through-
out nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made
clear and compels us to do so." Id. at 77-78.
The distinction between the result in Erie and that in Dimick might be explained on the
ground that Erie reversed the Swift doctrine, which had been the target of growing dissatis-
faction, while Dimick upheld the procedural device of remittitur which had proven useful to
the federal courts. In Erie, the Supreme Court noted that, "[e]xperience in applying the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits ex-
pected to flow from the rule did not accrue." Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 74. In
Dimick, on the other hand, the Supreme Court noted that remittitur had proven a useful
procedural device which federal courts would have been loathe to lose while "no federal court
... ha[d] ever undertaken ... to increase.., damages" by employing an additur procedure.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935). See generally Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Thompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 271-80 (1946)
(questioning the constitutional nature of Erie, and arguing that the inconsistencies of justice
caused by Swift made its overruling predictable); Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (supporting the constitutional
nature of Erie, and arguing that Erie was necessary because Swift failed to achieve its aim of
creating uniformity in a general federal common law); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 197 (1957) (argu-
ing that the constitutional basis for Erie is unclear and courts should not rule on its constitu-
tional aspects until resolved by the Supreme Court); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson,
47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1346-47 (1938) (arguing that Erie was dictated by considerations of
policy and the widespread criticism of Swift); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271, 294-95 (1939)
(considering the constitutional argument in Erie dictum); Note, The Law Applied in Diversity
Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678 (1976) (arguing
that most cases can be determined by the Rules of Decision Act and Erie's constitutional
questions need not be reached). The usefulness and salubrious effects of a procedure, how-
ever, should not serve as justification for the Supreme Court's willingness to overlook poten-
tial constitutional defects.
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beit weak, case could be made for remittitur on historical grounds
as having some roots in the common law while, in the Court's opin-
ion, no such support could be found for additur.68 Moreover, the
Court noted that while federal courts had regularly utilized remitti-
tur for over a hundred years, no federal court had sought to use
additur, another form of the "tradition" argument.69 Another ma-
jor distinction which the majority identified was the fact that in ad-
ditur the judge would be conditioning denial of a new trial on the
defendant's agreement to increase the verdict to an amount greater
than that found by the jury, clearly a substitution of the judge's
evaluation of the evidence for that of the jury, while in remittitur
the judge would be conditioning denial of a new trial on the plain-
tiff's agreement to accept a verdict smaller than that found by the
jury, arguably not a substitution of the trial judge's evaluation for
that of the jury. As the majority argued:7"
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a re-
mission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible sup-
port in the view that what remains is included in the verdict
along with the unlawful excess-in the sense that it has been
found by the jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of
merely lopping off an excrescense. But where the verdict is too
small, an increase by the court is a bold addition of something
which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict.
The historical argument will be addressed below in considering
the dissenting opinion.71 The "established use" argument was re-
jected above.72 A distinction between remittitur and additur on
grounds that a remittitur-reduced verdict is included in the jury ver-
dict while an additur-increased verdict is not so included is spe-
cious. The verdict of a federal jury is supposed to be the amount
which the jury determined to be the appropriate measure of the
plaintiff's recoverable damages.73 It is quite as unreasonable to say
that the jury verdict impliedly included lesser amounts as it would
be to find an implication that greater amounts were also included.
68. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935).
69. Id. at 487. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
70. 293 U.S. at 486.
71. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967) (committee's draft of a bill to
assure nondiscrimination in federal and state jury selection and service); Note, Invasion of
Jury Deliberations: Existing Rules and Suggested Changes, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 445 (1970);
Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258 (1970); Note, Impeachment of
Jury Verdicts by Jurors: A Proposal, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 388.
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The jury does not provide a "range" of appropriate jury-found ver-
dicts, with its announced verdict being the maximum in the range.
If such a view were adopted, a more reasonable conclusion would
be that the announced jury verdict formed the midpoint of some
allowable range of verdicts. In the United States jury system, how-
ever, one function of the jury is to agree on a single amount which
either each member of the jury (if a unanimous verdict is required)
or the required majority of the jury, determined to be the amount
necessary to compensate the plaintiff.7 4 Both decreasing and in-
creasing this amount involve a trial judge's substitution of his own
evaluation of the facts for that of the jury. The above description of
the function of a civil jury derives from interpretations of the sev-
enth amendment;7 5 therefore, the underlying question at hand is
whether either procedure violates the seventh amendment proscrip-
tion of reexamining facts tried by a jury in a manner other than that
recognized at the common law.76
The dissenters in Dimick maintained that proper historical anal-
ysis would lead to the conclusion that neither remittitur nor additur
violate the seventh amendment.77 Noting that "[t]here is nothing in
its history or language to suggest that the amendment had any pur-
pose but to preserve the essentials of the jury trial as it was known
to the common law,"'78 the dissenting opinion went on to point out
that the amendment had not been interpreted to "confine the trial
judge, in determining what issues are for the jury and what for the
court, to the particular forms of trial practice in vogue in 1791." 79
New procedural devices, unknown at the common law, had been
employed without constitutional objection; "this court has found in
the seventh amendment no bar to the adoption by the federal courts
of ... novel methods of dealing with the verdict of a jury .... ,0
Viewing the term "common law" to refer to a decision-making pro-
cess rather than a freeze-frame photograph of the practices and pro-
cedures of English courts in 1791,1 the dissenters concluded that
74. See supra note 73. See also supra note 7.
75. See supra note 73. See also supra note 7.
76. See supra note 58.
77. 293 U.S. 474, 488-98 (1935).
78. Id. at 490.
79. Id. at 491.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Prior to Dimick, the Supreme Court had frequently asserted that the purpose of the
seventh amendment was to preserve the substance of a common law jury trial, not the forms
of procedure employed at the common law. See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
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additur would not affect the essentials of the jury's function.8 2 Be-
cause of the structure of the common law courts, the question
before the court was "one unknown to the common law," and, thus,
the dissenters saw no reason to search the common law for analo-
gous or contrary cases."s The dissenters further buttressed their po-
sition by noting that the Supreme Court had not fourid difficulty in
"modernizing" the rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in
federal courts:84
The common law is not one system when it, or some part of it, is
adopted by the Judiciary Act, and another if it is taken over by
the seventh amendment. If this court could thus, in conformity
with the common law, substitute a new rule for an old one be-
cause it was more consonant with modem conditions, it would
seem that no violence would be done to the common law by ex-
tending the principle of remittitur to the case where the verdict is
inadequate, although the common law had made no rule on the
subject in 1791 ....
Some commentators8 5 and judges, 86 after considering the histor-
ical data, have concluded that the seventh amendment should not
bar either remittitur or additur. Some have based their conclusions
on the dissent's argument that neither remittitur nor additur was a
recognized procedure at the common law, and that the common
law was not meant to be a static set of rules and precedents, but
rather a dispute-resolution approach to which new procedures
could be added when new problems arose.8 7 Under the structure of
the judicial system at the common law, conditional new trial orders
could never be required because the situation in which such orders
could be made would not arise. On the other hand, under the sub-
stantially different structure adopted in the United States federal
courts, such orders were a natural result of the functioning of the
trial process.88 This argument, which makes very good sense, could
82. 293 U.S. at 492.
83. Id. The dissent noted that appellate court review of a trial court's discretionary
action, such as the one at issue, would not have been available at the common law. Id. at
491-92, 492 n.2.
84. Id. at 496.
85. See, eg., Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 163; Comment, Cor-
rection of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24. But see Comment, Remittitur Review,
supra note 15, at 386-91, 400 (maintaining that remittitur is unconstitutional in cases in
which "damages are unliquidated and no clear rules of law apply").
86. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 488-98 (1935) (dissenting opinion);
Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 1934) (dissenting opinion).
87. See, e-g., Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24.
88. The dissenting opinion in Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.
1951), a case dealing with the authority of appellate courts to require that a successful plain-
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be summarized as follows: If the federal courts had been structured
identically with the common law system, it would be reasonable to
search the common law for precedents for remittitur and additur.
When, however, the system changed substantially in the transporta-
tion from England to the United States, the search for specific cases
to support a new procedure in a new system is nonsensical.
Some authorities have gone beyond the dissent in Dimick by
finding, in the common law, historical antecedents for remittitur
and additur.89 These commentators would ascribe the Dimick ma-
jority's analysis to incorrect interpretation of the historical data.
Some authorities further question the result in Dimick, not on
its constitutional analysis but on the defensibility of treating additur
differently from remittitur.9 ° These courts and commentators argue
that both procedures should be employed or both should be re-
jected, there being no real conceptual distinction between them in
terms of the inviolability of the verdict of the jury.
The dissenters in Dimick had the better position both in logic
and in constitutional analysis. Despite the seventh amendment,
both procedural devices should be available to federal courts. On
the other hand, however, the manner in which some federal courts
use the device creates a violation of the right to a trial by jury, not
because of historical precedent, but because of current abuse of the
procedure by overzealous trial and appellate court judges.91 More-
over, for reasons other than the seventh amendment, the procedure
of remittitur, as currently employed by the federal courts, should be
tiff remit the excessive part of a verdict or submit to a new trial, included detailed historical
analysis. Id. at 477-84 (Holmes, J. dissenting). Judge Holmes pointed out that, according to
Blackstone, common law courts not only had jurisdiction to, but were obligated to, amend
jury verdicts in regard of errors of law and fact and, if the trial court was unable to make the
correction, "it was referred to a higher tribunal." Id. at 480 (quoting Bracton, as quoted in
Blackstone's Commentaries). Moreover, "[]ike the earlier inferior courts of the United
States that exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction, the King's Bench was presided
over by one or more judges, who sat together in courts that were mutually connected." Id at
480. The major procedural difference between current United States courts and the common
law courts, is that at the common law a motion for a new trial was not heard by the trial
judge but in a separate proceeding before the King's Bench en banc. Id. at 484 n. 10. Thus, at
the common law there would have been no opportunity for a trial judge to grant a new trial at
all, so the possibility of a conditional new trial could not be contemplated.
89. See, e.g., Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475, 477-84 (5th Cir. 1951)
(Holmes, J. dissenting); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24.
90. See, e.g., Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 160-63; Comment
Statutory Authorization, supra note 15, at 113; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at
673-74.
91. See infra notes 180-233 and accompanying text.
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substantially changed, curtailed or eliminated entirely.92 Instead of
adopting additur wholesale, if additur is to be used, its practice
should also be substantially limited along lines similar to those de-
scribed below for remittitur. The house of cards, which started
with Mr. Justice Story in Blunt v. Little, should be toppled and a
new, more efficacious structure erected.93
B. Current Remittitur Practice
Before an examination of current remittitur practice, with a
view toward suggesting remedial alternatives, the basics of the pro-
cedural device, as now employed by federal courts, must be out-
lined. As noted above,94 a defendant who thinks that the jury
verdict against him is excessive, may move for a new trial on that
ground. The defendant may, in addition, move for a remittitur-a
new trial conditioned on the plaintiff's refusal to remit the excess
part of his verdict.9" The trial judge may make a conditional new
trial order even if the defendant has merely asked for a new trial on
the ground of excessiveness. 96 The defendant's agreement to this
remittitur procedure is neither necessary nor sought, because, in
theory at least, he cannot complain-if the plaintiff refuses to remit,
the defendant will get the desired new trial, and if the plaintiff
agrees to remit, the defect in the verdict will be cured and any need
for the desired new trial will be eliminated.97 In fact, in view of the
federal trial judge's power, under Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to order a new trial on his "own initiative... for
any reason for which [he] might have granted a new trial on motion
of a party," 98 the trial judge should also have the power to order a
remittitur on his own initiative.99 Of course, a defendant who had
92. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
96. Remittitur practice has not evolved as a device sought by defendants, but as a device
available to a trial judge who wanted to circumvent the need to grant a total or partial new
trial. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
97. See, eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 12-13; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at
672.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
99. See Marder v. Conwed, 75 F.R.D. 48, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1977). A conditional new trial
order on the court's own initiative might be viewed as an inappropriate intrusion on the
adversary system. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 302 n.23. Moreover, a trial
judge should be wary of his own assessment of damages as being excessive if the defendant
has not objected. Id Those arguments, however, do not recognize that the defendant may
not be aware of the excessive nature of the verdict. The trial judge's power to order a new
trial on his own initiative should function to protect each party from the possibility that a
19871
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
not moved for a new trial could hardly complain of such a boon.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, would certainly feel slighted if a
trial judge took such action in the absence of a defendant's
request.00
Only certain excessive verdicts can be "cured" by the proper
application of remittitur. Most federal courts do not employ remit-
titur if the trial judge finds that the excessiveness of the jury verdict
is a result of "passion or prejudice" on the part of the jury.10 1 In
harmful error which occurred at trial was not recognized by him or by his attorney. The trial
process should not be a game in which the party must "say the magic word" or suffer the
consequences of a verdict which is the product of prejudicial error. Moreover, the defendant
might have tactical reasons for not seeking a new trial even though he views the damages as
excessive. The trial judge has the responsibility to correct prejudicial errors by granting a
new trial. If the defendant does not want the new trial (assuming that the plaintiff has re-
fused to remit), he can enter into a post-triai settlement with the plaintiff.
100. As noted above, see supra note 99, not only should the trial judge have the power to
enter such a new trial order on his own initiative, but he also has an affirmative duty to the
judicial system to do so. If he did not so act, a plaintiff might obtain the fruits of an illegally
excessive verdict (a verdict which is excessive as a matter of law) just because the defendant
and his attorney did not appreciate the relevant law.
This Article, proposes elimination of current remittitur practice in favor of alternative
procedures. See infra notes 247-62 and accompanying text. This proposal would not, how-
ever, affect the trial judge's power to order a whole new trial on his own initiative on the
ground of excessiveness of the jury verdict.
101. See, Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1985)
(court orders new trial rather than remittitur because the jury was influenced by an erroneous
argument, noting that "[w]hen a jury verdict results from passion or prejudice, a new trial is
the proper remedy rather than remittitur"); Howell v. Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, 532
F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1976) (court remands to district court for that court to calculate
and order a remittitur of part of excessive award for past and future pain and loss of earning
capacity, noting that "we do not believe the jury was actuated in its verdict by passion or
prejudice, and it is thus appropriate for us to consider ordering a conditional remittitur"
(footnote omitted)); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 463, 465 (E.D. Tex.
1985) (court orders remittitur of actual and punitive damages, noting that "[t]rial courts
should employ remittiturs for those verdicts that are so large as to be contrary to right rea-
son, while requiring a new trial on issues infected by passion or prejudice" and finding that
"the jurors in this case were not infected by passion or prejudice"); Hodges v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (court orders remittitur of compensa-
tory damages, noting that "[w]hen [considering] a motion for new trial on the issue of exces-
sive damages, the court may, if the verdict is not judged to have been the result of the jury's
passion or prejudice, offer the plaintiff the options of new trial or remittitur" and concluding
that "the jury verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice"); Dick v. Wantonwan
County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1107-08 (D. Minn. 1983) (court orders remittitur of compensa-
tory damages, noting that "[a] new trial is mandatory when the excessive verdict results from
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury because of the possibility that these influences
affected the jury's findings on liability as well as on damages" and concluding that the verdict
"is not so excessive as to give rise to the inference that the jury was motivated by passion and
prejudice"); Schreffler v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981) (court
orders remittitur of compensatory and punitive damages, noting that "where the verdict is so
grossly excessive as to admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or
prejudice, the proper remedy is a new trial and not remittitur" and that "[w]here ... the
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such circumstances, trial judges should order a new trial because
passion or prejudice renders defective the entire verdict and not just
the jury's assessment of the proper measure of damages. The trial
judge must determine, however, whether the jury acted with pas-
sion or prejudice, usually a difficult determination based on infer-
ences. Often the defendant will argue that the size of a large
verdict, in itself, demonstrates passion or prejudice by the jury."0 2
The defendant may also focus on improprieties in the conduct of the
plaintiff's case, such as improper arguments by the plaintiff's coun-
verdict is not patently the product of bias, passion or prejudice, but simply is 'just too much'
for the Court conscionably to tolerate, the verdict may be modified by granting a remittitur,"
concluding that the jury award was "too much" but apparently not "so grossly excessive");
Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court orders a new trial
on the issue of compensatory and punitive damages, noting that jury verdict based on passion
or prejudice must result in a new trial because to try to assess and correct the defect by
remittitur would be speculative and finding that the relative circumstances of the parties-the
plaintiff being a sick, old woman and the defendant being a large corporation-and an appeal
by the plaintiff to the jury for compassion combined to bias the jury); Collins v. Retail Credit
Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 933-34 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (court orders remittitur of punitive dam-
ages, concluding that the excessive jury verdict was "based on sufficient evidence and reason
and was not the result of passion and prejudice."). Some courts seem to use "passion or
prejudice" as a threshold for those situations in which any interference with a jury verdict,
including remittitur, would be appropriate. See, Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F.
Supp. 403, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court orders remittitur of punitive damage award, stating,
"[t]he court may intervene and set aside a verdict when the amount of the award is so exces-
sive that it shocks the judical conscience or it appears that it is the result of passion and
prejudice.").
Most appellate courts articulate a strict standard for interfering with jury verdicts, and
some courts base the standard on passion or prejudice. These courts, however, generally
indicate that, upon finding passion or prejudice, the court has the option of remittitur or new
trial, thereby taking upon themselves the job of "curing" the tainted verdict. See, Martin v.
Fleissner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to order new trial or remitti-
tur on actual damages, stating, "[t]he amount of damages is peculiarly within the discretion
of the jury and subject to correction by the trial court when it is convinced an award is over
liberal, and by an appellate court only.., in those extreme cases in which the amount
assessed is so shockingly excessive as manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by ca-
price, passion, or prejudice.") (quoting Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 436, 144 S.E. 2d 151,
154 (1965)); Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1977) (court
refuses to order new trial or remittitur on damages, stating, "the right of a plaintiff to have
this fact issue decided by a jury devolves from the seventh amendment.., and it is only in
case the amount awarded by a jury appears to be so excessive as to be unconscionable and to
arise from bias or prejudice that the appellate court considers it appropriate to intervene.").
See also, eg., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1975); Gor-
salitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. In Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Minn. 1983), a case arising
from involuntary commitment of plaintiffs for alcoholism treatment, the court noted: "The
defendants contend that the size of the verdict- $1 million in compensatory damgages and
$12,000 in punitive damages-automatically gives rise to an inference that the jury was moti-
vated by passion and prejudice." Id. at 1107. See also Schreffier v. Board of Educ., 506 F.
Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981) (suggesting that a verdict could be "so grossly excessive as to
admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or prejudice .... ").
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sel, as mandating the conclusion that the entire trial was tainted by
jury passion or prejudice.1 3 The trial judge, in an effort to preserve
as much of the original trial as possible, will often rule against the
defendant on these arguments, describing the misconduct as harm-
less error and ascribing the excessiveness of the verdict to immoder-
ate zeal on the part of the jury."°3 Some judges, however, order
remittiturs even though they find that prejudicial error occurred at
103. Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984), was a
wrongful death action arising from an airplane crash. The district court ordered a remittitur
of $4,274,500, on the grounds that testimony adduced at trial was flawed and should not
have been admitted and that defects in discovery had denied the defendants a fair trial. The
court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, stating:
We need not choose among these various [remittitur] rules, however, for these for-
mulations are not appropriate for use in the instant case. These formulations are
designed for circumstances in which a properly instructed jury hearing properly
admitted evidence nevertheless makes an excessive award. They are not designed
for a case such as the present one, in which prejudicial error has infected the jury's
entire consideration of plaintiff's pecuniary loss.
Id. at 50. See also Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238-43 (5th
Cir. 1985) (court remands for new trial rather than grant remittitur because of improper
argument by plaintiff's attorney which was not corrected by trial judge and thus amounted to
prejudicial error); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff ob-
jected to new trial order at the trial court level, arguing that a remittitur should have been
granted; court of appeals rejects argument, noting that remittitur is discretionary and that
verdict in first trial was tainted by a combination of circumstances including two improper
appeals to the jury by the plaintiff's attorney, and the jury's apparent desire, as indicated in a
note to the judge, to punish the defendant); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons', 624 F.2d
749, 755 (6th Cir. 1980) (Action instituted by city for damages to public dock. District court
ordered remittitur of 50% of jury award, and city refused to remit. At second trial, the city
obtained judgment for full amount sought, and the court of appeals reversed, granting a new
trial on all issues because of "pervasive misconduct of counsel for the City" at the trial.);
Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 530 F.2d 34, 34 (5th Cir. 1976) (court of appeals finds ver-
dict excessive and orders a new trial because it was "unable to determine the theory of liabil-
ity on which the jury premised its overly generous verdict... [and thus could not] limit ...
remand to a remittitur or a partial new trial."); Libeo Corp. v. Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1986) (trial court ordered new trial on its own initiative based on excessive
damages. After various procedural events, a different trial court affirmed the new trial order,
rather than opting for remittitur, because of jury confusion arising from trial court's instruc-
tions); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367, 369 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (court grants "motions to set aside or reduce the verdict... by reason of the excessive-
ness of the jury's award and the willful misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in tampering with
the evidence transmitted to the deliberating jury."); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F.
Supp. 1, 1-2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court grants new trial on damages because excessive jury
verdict was a product of passion or prejudice produced, at least in part, by the plaintiff's
improper appeal to the jury's compassion); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744, 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (although trial court finds that "[t]he excessiveness of the verdict was un-
doubtedly the result of [plaintiff's] counsel's suggestion of specific amounts to the jury," the
court orders remittitur.).
104. See, e.g., Walters v. Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73, 82 (3rd Cir. 1985); Hansen v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984); Schreffier v. Bd. of Educ., 506 F.
Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981).
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trial."° These judges seek to identify the manner in which the error
affected the jury verdict, and to cure the error by asking the plaintiff
to remit the "infected" amount.1 "6 In so doing, however, the trial
judge might be overstepping the allowable limits on protecting the
fruits of his labors. The defendant can point to the error and claim
that other defendants in similar circumstances have been granted
new trials instead of having the trial judge try to "correct" the jury
verdict in this piecemeal way.1 1 7 The defendant can further argue
that the whole course of the trial might have been different had the
error not occurred. On the other hand, where the prejudicial error
amounts to an identifiable element in the verdict, such as the trial
judge's incorrect inclusion in his instructions to the jury of an unal-
lowable element of damages,108 such as incorrect valuation of inter-
est, remittitur of the calculable amount ascribable to the error
would be appropriate and would benefit everyone involved.10 9 The
line drawn by courts in such cases has varied from court to court
and from case to case.110
The trial judge must, of course, also decide whether the jury
verdict is excessive at all. If the court decides that the verdict is not
excessive, the court will deny the defendant's new trial motion on
105. See Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court grants remittitur even though excessive verdict is the result of "willful
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel"); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744, 747 (court
grants remittitur even though the excessive verdict is the result of improper arguments by
plaintiff's counsel).
106. See supra note 105. If the source of prejudicial error is the conduct of the plaintiff or
his attorney, a remittitur would attempt to save a defective proceeding by curing only one
manifestation of the defect, the excessive verdict. Such an approach is extremely unfair to the
defendant and encourages the plaintiff to engage in unfair trial tactics.
107. See Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238-43 (5th Cir.
1985) (court orders new trial in excessive verdict case because of improper argument by plain-
tiff's attorney); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1984)
(court orders new trial in excessive verdict case because of plaintiff's improper introduction
of flawed testimony and because of defective discovery); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793,
797-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (court confirms new trial order in case involving improper appeals to
the jury by the plaintiff's attorney); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons', 624 F.2d 749,
760 (6th Cir. 1980) (court orders new trial on ground of misconduct of plaintiff's attorney);
Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 530 F.2d 34, 34 (5th Cir. 1976) (court orders new trial
because of confusing trial court jury instructions as to differing theories of liability); Libco
Corp. v. Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386 (N.D. III. Apr. 29, 1986) (court confirms new trial on
ground of confusing jury instructions); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 1-2
(E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court orders new trial, in part because of plaintiff's improper appeal to
the jury).
108. See infra notes 117-18, 130-32 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 127, 181-82, 257-60.
109. See infra notes 117-18.
110. See infra notes 117-18.
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the ground of excessiveness, and will deny the defendant's motion
for a remittitur."1 In making such a decision, the trial courts usu-
111. See, Union Oil Co. v. Rainey, 777 F.2d 705, 709 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985)
(court refuses to disturb jury award as to punitive or compensatory damages, finding the
awards supported by ample evidence in the record); Pucalik v. Holiday Inns, 777 F.2d 359,
363-64 (7th Cir. 1985) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,250,000 in wrongful death
case, basing its decision on the elements of damage allowable under the Indiana wrongful
death statute and the circumstances of the case); Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 368 (7th Cir.
1985) (court refuses to disturb compensatory damage award of $80,770 for prior prison in-
mate, finding the award "considering the circumstances of this case [not] ... shocking.");
Alaniz v. San Isidro Indep. Sch. Dist., 742 F.2d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to
disturb jury award of $101,016.96 for lost wages and compensatory damages in civil rights
action for wrongful discharge, finding "sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's
findings."); Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 502-03 (10th Cir. 1984)
(court refuses to disturb jury award of $80,000 for actual and compensatory damages in
products liability suit, finding the award not excessive and supported by the evidence.); Blev-
ins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576, 1579-82 (10th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb
jury award of $2,000,000 in actual damages and damages for pain and suffering arising from
injuries sustained during emergency landing, noting that "we cannot say that the jury's award
for pain, suffering and disability 'shocks the judicial conscience' "); Martin v. Texaco, Inc.,
726 F.2d 207, 217 (5th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,000,000 in exem-
plary damages to decedent's widow, finding that "[t]he award was based on a jury finding of
gross negligence, and the amount was not inappropriate"); Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R., 725
F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,811,177 for com-
pensatory damages for personal injury, finding that "the verdict is not grossly excessive");
McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 246-48 (Ist Cir. 1984) (court refuses
to disturb jury award of $949,000 in damages for breach of warranty and negligent design of
mace cannister, finding that on "[v]iewing the evidence on damages in the light most
favorable to [plaintiff], we do not regard the jury verdict as grossly excessive"); Whiteley v.
OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1983) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$151,700 for breach of warranties, finding "we are not shocked by the size of the verdict
awarded"); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1982) (court
refuses to disturb jury award of $600,000 to estate of automobile passenger injured in crash,
finding that the award did not "clearly exceed.., that amount that any reasonable man could
feel [he] is entitled to"); Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 1980) (court refuses
to disturb jury award of $85,000 in suit for attorney's fees, finding that the jury verdict did
not reach the point at which it "clearly appear[ed] that the jury [had] reached a seriously
erroneous result."); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1981) (court
refuses to disturb jury award of $35,000 against union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion, finding that "[tihe jury's award was well within the limits of the proof"); Crador v.
Louisiana Dep't. of Highways, 625 F.2d 1227, 1230 (5th Cir. 1980) (court refuses to disturb
jury award of $250,000 for loss of income and pain and suffering because of back injury,
finding themselves "not prepared to say that it is 'certain indeed that the award is contrary to
all reason' "); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 295-97 (7th Cir. 1979) (court refuses
to disturb jury award of $700,000 in compensatory damages in wrongful death action, finding
that although they thought the verdict was "too high," it was not so high as to be "grossly
excessive"); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117, 1123 (10th Cir. 1978)
(court refuses to disturb jury award of $200,000 for injuries sustained in a skiing accident,
finding that while "it might strike us that the award... is high," the court was "unable to say
in this instance that it was" so high as to be "grossly excessive"); Brown v. Skaggs-Albert-
son's Properties, 563 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$20,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages arising from damages suffered
because defendant falsely reported to a check verification association that plaintiff's check
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ally distinguish between verdicts which are merely larger than the
trial judge would have granted had he been given the task of assess-
had bounced, finding that the jury award was not "so excessive as to 'strike mankind, at first
blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous' "); Adams v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$20,000 as compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful repossession of an automobile,
finding that while "other judges might well conclude that a much less substantial sum would
be adequate .... we are simply unable to say that this falls into the very exceptional class of
cases in which we can determine that the trial court abused its discretion"); Sadowski v.
Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1976) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$100,000 for damages arising from snow-mobile accident, finding that "[ulpon the basis of the
evidence in this case considered in the light of present day verdict ranges held to be not
excessive, we are unable to say that the district court should have ordered a remittitur");
Menard v. Penrod Drilling Co., 538 F.2d 1084, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1976) (court refuses to
disturb jury award of $250,000 for personal injuries sustained on a submersible drilling rig,
finding that "[g]iving due weight to the verdict of thejury and to the rulings of the trial judge,
we cannot, under the applicable rules of review, hold the jury's verdict excessive"); Rawson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (D. Colo. 1985) (court refuses to disturb jury
award for $19,000,000 for actual damages, damages for pain and suffering, and exemplary
damages for age discrimination, finding that the award was not excessive in view of the evi-
dence and circumstances of the case); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 169,
178-79 (D. Minn. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $54,000 for actual damages
from employment discrimination, finding that the award correctly reflected plaintiff's actual
damages and that plaintiff made an effort to mitigate damages); Kelly v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 552 F. Supp. 399, 401-03 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$1,250,000 under FELA for injuries sustained in railroad yard accident, finding that "[e]ven
though the result may have been too generous and was doubtless surprising [and] ... presses
allowable limits, I am unable to declare the verdict 'shocking' or to announce a 'firm convic-
tion' that a 'clear miscarriage of justice' has occurred"); Vaughn v. Hardemon, 508 F. Supp.
97, 99-100 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (court refuses to disturb compensatory jury awards of $409,647
for injured truck driver and $100,000 for his spouse, finding that "[w]hile the award is proba-
bly more than the court would have awarded .... the verdict is supported by the evidence in
the case"), aff'd, 622 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F. Supp.
1019, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $360,000 in compensa-
tory damages for injuries sustained when plaintiff slipped and injured himself, finding that
"[t]he total trial record demonstrates sufficient evidentiary support of the verdict"); Washing-
ton v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134, 1135 (D.D.C. 1979) (court refuses
to disturb jury award of $378,890.39 in a FELA suit, finding that "[t]he verdict is consistent
with and is supported by evidence adduced by the plaintiff"); Norfin, Inc. v. International
Business Machs., 81 F.R.D. 614, 616-17 (D. Colo. 1979) (court refuses to disturb jury award
of $7,500,000 as lost profits on patent infringement, finding that the "verdict... is within the
range of the evidence [and] ... the dollar amount is [not] of such a magnitude as to shock the
conscience of the court"); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark.
1979) (court refuses to disturb jury awards of $5,000 compensatory damages and $250,000
punitive damages under Fair Credit Reporting Act and state libel law, finding that the actual
damage award was reasonable and, further, that, in view of the defendant's massive assets,
the puntive damage award would stand), rev'd on other grounds, 619 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980); Murray v. Beloit Power Systems, 79 F.R.D. 590, 591-92 (D:V.I.
1978) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,747,855.60 for personal inujuries, finding that
"the jury's award was [not] the product of irrational behavior"); United States v. 534.28
Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 82, 86 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of
$61,500 in favor of landowners, finding that "[t]he verdict in this case was not so against the
weight of the credible evidence as to require a new trial or remittitur"). The above cited cases
19871
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ing damages but are still within the allowable range of verdicts pos-
sible on the facts adduced at trial, 2 and verdicts which are "clearly
excessive," "grossly excessive," or the like." 3 Most courts state
demonstrate the frequency with which, in the last ten years, remittiturs have been sought in
federal courts. See also supra note 31.
112. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expressed this attitude,
from an appellate court's point of view, in Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc.:
The fixing of damages is peculiarly the function of the jury, or of the trial judge
if there has been no jury. The appellate court is at a disadvantage in considering
whether an award is excessive because the standards are vague, requiring as they do
that the verdict be the product of passion, prejudice or improper motive. The fact
that it might strike us that the award of $200,000 is high is not sufficient. To find
that it was the product of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, it has to be
manifest that the amount awarded was grossly excessive. We are unable to say in
this instance that it was.
569 F.2d 1117, 1123 (10th Cir. 1978). See also, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d
286, 295-97 (7th Cir. 1979); Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 739-41 (5th Cir.
1977); Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 575 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (W.D. Mich.
1982), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985); Kelly v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 552 F. Supp. 399, 401-03 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Thornton v. Equifax,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 619 F.2d 700 (8th
Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
113. For appellate standards of review for the granting of remittitur, see Hollins v. Pow-
ell, 773 F.2d 191, 197 (8th Cir. 1985) (standard for grant of appellate remittitur is "a plain
injustice, or a monstrous or shocking result"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1635 (1986); Joan W. v.
City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1985) (standard for appellate remittitur
is "abuse of discretion" by trial judge in not granting remittitur; appellate remittitur granted
because "the jury award ... is flagrantly extravagant and out of line with the other [similar]
cases"); Walters v. Mintec/Int'l, 758 F.2d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 1985) (standard for appellate remit-
titur is a verdict "so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience"); Martin v. Fleiss-
ner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1984) (standard for appellate remittitur is that "the
amount assessed is 'so shockingly excessive as manifestly to show that the jury was actuated
by caprice, passion or prejudice'" (quoting Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 436, 144 S.E.2d
151, 154 (1965)); Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983) (standard
for appellate remittitur "require[s] such awards to be so large as to 'shock the judicial con-
science,' 'so gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right reason' (quoting Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 249 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958), so
exaggerated as to indicate 'bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive'
(quoting Allen v. Seacoast Prods., 623 F.2d 355, 365 (5th Cir. 1980), or as 'clearly ex-
ceed[ing] that amount that any reasonable man could feel the claimant is entitled to' " (quot-
ing Bridges v. Groendyki Transp., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original));
Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1982) (stan-
dard for appellate remittitur is "abuse of discretion" by the trial court, there being "no such
abuse ... unless there is a complete absence of evidence to support the verdict ... [or the
verdict] is so excessive that no reasonable juror, unswayed by passion or prejudice, could have
awarded that amount . . . [or that] the award was contrary to all reason"); Howell v.
Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, 536 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1976) (court grants remittitur
because amount awarded by the jury "is simply not in the universe of rational awards on the
evidence in this record"); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp 458, 463 (E.D. Tex.
1985) (trial court standard for remittitur is "verdicts that are so large as to be contrary to
right reason"); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (trial court
standard for remittitur is "when the trial judge is convinced that the damages are so excessive
as to shock his sense of justice"); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 40 (D. Colo.
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that remittitur is only appropriate in cases in which the jury verdict
is so large that it "shocks the conscience of the court, 114 while a
few judges find that shockingly large verdicts are necessarily the
product of passion or prejudice and order a new trial on that
ground.115 Some judges, on the other hand, seem to grant remit-
titurs in any case in which the judge disagrees with the verdict, even
if the amount of disagreement is relatively insubstantial.116 Again,
1983) (quoting Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 228 (10th Cir. 1962) (trial court standard for
remittitur is that verdict is "so excessive... as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an
irresistible inference that passion, prejudie ... or other improper cause invaded the trial
.. "); Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 (D. Minn. 1983) (court grants
remittitur because it "finds that the verdict is excessive and must be reduced in order to avoid
an unconscionable result"); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Serv., 547 F. Supp.
1168, 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1982) ("court finds the verdict as to damages to be so excesssive as to
shock the judicial conscience"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); Mor-
gan v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 509 F. Supp. 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("the jury's resolution
of the question of damages is not to be disturbed unless there is reason to believe it was the
result of passion, bias or prejudice, or that it is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the
court as a 'denial ofjustice' "); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 511 (M.D.
Pa. 1980) (standard is "grossly excessive" or "so clearly excessive as to shock the conscience
of the court"); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Md. 1975) ("it is the
duty of the trial court to grant a new trial when confronted with an excessive verdict,... or
when the verdict shocks the conscience of the court").
114. See cases cited supra note 113.
115. In Proler v. Modern Equip. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1985), a patent
infringement suit in which the jury awarded $75,000,000 in compensatory damages and $1 in
punitive damages, the court concluded that remittitur would be out of the question.
As to damages, the case is ... a fairy tale. If one closes one's eyes to reality,
perhaps it can be said that there is testimony in the record to support it. However,
the testimony given by Dr. Elliott is based for the most part on sheer speculation
Common sense is offended by the verdict.
If the jury award in this case had been $1.00 for compensatory and
$75,000,000.00 for punitive damages it would still be excessive as a whole, but at
least it would be somewhat more understandable. As it is, however, the award for
compensatory damages is clearly excessive. It simply cannot be sustained. Because
I find the damages to be excessive, I could grant a limited new trial or offer Mr.
Proler a remittitur option, as the award does not appear to have been motivated by
any prejudice on the part of the jury against Modern. A remittitur, however, would
only be in the $100,000$200,000 range, and because a sum in that area is so far
removed from what the jury awarded, I decline to offer an option.
602 F. Supp. at 1393-94.
Another district court has stated that "[tiechnically, where the verdict is so grossly exces-
sive as to admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or prejudice, the
proper remedy is a new trial and not a remittitur." Schreffier v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp.
1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981). See also, eg., Lowe v. General Motors, 624 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th
Cir. 1980); Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 494 F. Supp. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
modified, 646 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1981). But see, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1547-
50 (1I1th Cir. 1984) (appellate court orders remittitur of 90% of verdict rather than finding
extreme excess requires new trial).
116. Knight v. Texaco, 786 F.2d 1296, 1299-1301 (5th Cir. 1986) (court affirms district
court remittitur of 17.6% of jury verdict); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 93
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distinctions should be drawn between cases in which the errone-
ously excessive portion of the jury verdict is a liquidated amount-
that is where the source of error is identifiable and the measure of
damages traceable to the error is calculable, hereinafter "liquidated
amount cases"' 17-- and those cases in which the trial judge cannot
identify any particular source of error or cannot calculate an exact
(5th Cir. 1984) (appellate court reverses award of punitive damages and attorney's fees, while
ordering remittitur of 20% of compensatory damage award); Stineman v. Fontbonne College,
664 F.2d 1082, 1090 (8th Cir. 1981) (appellate court orders remittitur of 25% of compensa-
tory damages); Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellate court
orders one plaintiff to remit 29.6% of award for future medical expenses); Dullard v. Berke-
ley Assoc., 606 F.2d 890, 896 (2d Cir. 1979) (appellate court orders remittitur of 23.5% of
award of damages for wrongful death); Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir.
1979) (appellate court orders remittitur of 21.8% of damages for breach of contract); Com-
munity Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 586
F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979) (court orders remittitur of 8% of
jury verdict for breach of warranty); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331, 1336
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (court orders remitti-
tur of 5.7% of jury verdict for breach of employment contract); Martin B. Glauser Dodge
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009, 1019-23 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 570
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (court orders remittitur of 15.5% of
damages for antitrust violation).
117. Such cases would include not only circumstances in which the jury miscalculated
the damages (for example, because of a typographical error in papers submitted to the jury or
because of some clear mechanical error in the damage calculation), but also, cases in which
the elements of damage are established by law, thus requiring a certain result, but in which
the jury came up with a different figure. In the first category of cases, excessive verdict based
on mechnical errors probably could not be avoided. In the second category of cases, where
the elements of a damage calculation are established as a matter of law, however, such
problems could be eliminated if the trial judge sought a special verdict, pursuant to Rule
49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the court would submit specific ques-
tions of fact to the jury but would then calculate damages, according to the jury's allocation
of liability, based on the appropriate legal formula. In Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 57-58
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985), the court remanded for a new trial on
the issue of damages, noting, "had... particularized special verdicts been returned.., as to
damages ... both our task, and that of the parties and the District Court on remand, would
have been greatly facilitated."
Many recent remittitur cases have either been "liquidated amount cases" or the court has
treated the case as such by making a mechanical calculation, usually based on prior awards in
similar cases, of allowable damages. See Enterprise Ref. v. Sector Ref., 781 F.2d 1116, 1120
(5th Cir. 1986) (remittitur or new trial in breach of service contract case because jury
awarded $731,600 while court found that "[t]here is nothing to be balanced and nothing to be
weighed; the record is wholly devoid of any support for any figure in excess of $422,220.00,"
a figure suggested by plaintiff's own expert witness); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756
F.2d 821, 826-34 (1lth Cir. 1985) (court orders remittitur of part of jury award for lost
wages, calculating, on the basis of the facts, the maximum allowable recovery on those facts
for lost wages); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1984) (in
wrongful death action for loss of adult son, court orders remittitur of award in excess of sum
of high recent award granted plus one third); American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals,
743 F.2d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 1984) (court orders remittitur of amount attributable to one
element of damages not properly proven at trial, noting that "[w]hen evidence of damages has
been admitted erroneously and the effect of the error can be reasonably approximated to a
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amount traceable to the error. In "liquidated amount cases," a re-
definite portion of the verdict, this court may condition its affirmance on the plaintiff remit-
ting that portion of the verdict"); Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143,
150 (5th Cir. 1983) (court affirms district court order of remittitur of $800,000 to correct jury
error in taking a number "off the wrong line" in a chart sent into the jury room, noting that
"remittitur should be awarded when the jury has made a clear oversight and the correction is
mechanical"); Everett v. S.H. Parks and Assocs., 697 F.2d 250, 253-55 (8th Cir. 1983) (court
orders remittitur of part of damages awarded for breach of oral employment contract, calcu-
lating the "maximum amount reasonably supported by [plaintiff's] evidence" and noting that
"[w]here the discrepancy between the award and the maximum amount reasonably supported
by the evidence is apparent and the correction basically mechanical ... the correction can be
made at the appellate level"); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-75 (Ist Cir. 1982)
(court orders remittitur of part of damage award in breach of contract case, calculating remit-
titur-reduced damages based on upper limits of allowable elements of damages and noting
that "[a]lthough the jury's award was excessive as a matter of law, a new trial may not be
necessary [because t]he deficits in the award are readily identified and measured"); United
States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1982) (court orders remittitur
of part of compensation award in eminent domain proceeding, basing its remittitur on expert
calculations); Geyer v. Vargas Prods., 627 F.2d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (court affirms trial
court remittitur in breach of contract case, the remittitur being based on the jury's error in
failing to subtract the plaintiff's expenses avoided by not having to perform the contract);
Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1979) (court orders remittitur based on its
estimate, in a breach of contract case, "of the effect on the verdict of the inflated and duplica-
tive damage figures" adduced at trial); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1083,
1087 (7th Cir. 1978) (trial court had required remittitur of certain elements of compensatory
damages which it concluded should not have been submitted to the jury; appellate court
orders new trial or additional remittitur down to an amount "as to which there was no dis-
pute"); Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1977) (district
court had granted a remittitur to correct a mechanical error by the jury in damages assess-
ment; appellate court reverses on other grounds), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Palmer
Coal & Rock Co. v. Gulf Oil Co. 524 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1975) (appellate court confirms
trial court remittitur order based on "computations supported by the evidence"), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 969 (1976); Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612, 618-19 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (remit-
titur order used to cure faulty verdict which could be "traced to a specific misconception on
the part of the jury and the effect of that misconception is readily calculable"); Jeanneret v.
Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), (court orders remittitur in breach of implied
warranty of title case by calculating the present value of the thing lost (the painting to which
defendant did not have title) plus interest on money borrowed); rev'd on other grounds, 693
F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982); Marsh v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 521 F. Supp. 1007, 1010
(D. Del. 1981) (court orders remittitur of part of award for future medical expenses, basing
its calculation on the maximum damages allowable under the evidence adduced at trial);
Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 102-03
(D.S.C. 1979) (court orders 25% remittitur on compensatory damage award for replacement
of roof, such remittitur representing the value to the plaintiff of five years of satisfactory use
of roof which had been represented as a "20-year roof"), aff'd, 664 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981);
Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 508 F. Supp. 14, 15-16 (E.D. Mo. 1980)(court orders
remittitur in age discrimination in employment case, based on readily identifiable fact that
jury had neglected to subtract, from its calculation of lost wages, "benefits and earnings re-
ceived by the plaintiff" after his employment was terminated), aff'd, 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp.
jul 191, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court orders remittitur of seaman's award for maintenance
and cure, the recoverable amount being established by union contract), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); Community Television Servs., Inc. v.
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mittitur of a small portion of the jury verdict would be appropriate
because the error can be identified and corrected."' In other cases
in which the trial judge expresses a more generalized dissatisfaction
with the size of the verdict, he should not be authorized to chip off
small bits of the jury verdict; he should allow for the strong possibil-
ity that the jury's assessment of damages is within the legally per-
missible range of verdicts." 9 Otherwise, he would seem to be
substituting his own verdict for that of the jury rather than merely
correcting a mathematical error made by the jury. This caveat is
especially applicable in cases in which part of the damages are allo-
cated to pain and suffering or some other form of damages which
cannot be determined with mathematical precision.' 20  In these ar-
Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214, 216-18 (D.S.D. 1977) (court orders small remittitur
based on its finding that the jury award was more than the maximum allowable on the facts
and on its calculation of an appropriate award), aff'd, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Keystone Floor Prods. v. Beattie Mfg., 432 F. Supp. 869, 884
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (court orders a remittitur of difference between the incentive bonus actually
established at trial to have received by plaintiff in a prior year and the amount awarded by the
jury which was based on a figure provided in one of the plaintiff's exhibits); Martin B.
Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009, 1023 (D.N.J. 1976) (court orders
remittitur which would remove from jury verdict "certain identifiable sums... which were
improper"), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978).
118. See Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214 (D.S.D. 1977)
(remittitur of 8%), aff'd, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932; Meyer v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (remittitur of 5.7%), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976) (remittitur of 15.5%), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
119. See, eg., Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986); Harper v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082
(8th Cir. 1981); Dullard v. Berkeley Assocs., 606 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1979).
120. As one district court stated in the personal injury case Marsh v. Interstate & Ocean
Transport Co.:
Damages cannot be calculated in a strict mathematical formula, and jurors and
judges often differ in their estimates of the appropriate amount to be awarded in a
given case. Here, the Court cannot say that the general damages, while high, were
so excessive as to warrant the Court's intervention into the Jury's findings. There is
evidence in the record to justify the Jury's finding. The award of general damages
must, therefore, be permitted to stand.
521 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Del. 1981) (citation omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a contract case, observed a
difference in the treatment by federal courts of jury verdicts in tort cases and in contract
cases:
Generousness of a jury's award does not alone justify an appellate court in set-
ting it aside. In tort cases, where the damges are given to compensate for losses not
susceptible of arithmetical calculation, such as pain and grief, we have declined to
second-guess a jury unless its verdict is "grossly excessive" or "shocking to the
conscience." In contract or other cases involving only economic loss, the standard
of review is somewhat different, although still deferential to the jury. In cases of
that type, in the words of Judge Wisdom, a verdict is excessive as a matter of law if
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eas the jury performs one of its most important functions-bringing
the collective experiences of the group to bear on the consideration
of the damages to be awarded for such a loss.121
After a trial judge has decided that the jury verdict is excessive,
he must then determine the amount to be remitted by the plaintiff if
the plaintiff wishes to avoid a new trial. Most courts make the cal-
culation of the amount to be remitted by using a "reasonable jury"
standard, with some courts determining the amount to be remitted
as that necessary to reduce the verdict to the amount which the trial
judge thinks a reasonable jury would have granted.'22 Other courts,
reluctant to interfere with the jury verdict any more than is neces-
sary, ask the plaintiff to remit the amount necessary to reduce the
jury verdict to the "maximum amount" that a reasonable jury
would have awarded.123 These "maximum recovery" courts con-
clude that the trial judge tampers least with the intentions of the
jurors, who by implication wanted to fully compensate the plain-
tiffs, if he allows remittitur up to the maximum verdict he considers
supportable. 124
In these calculations, the trial judge is often covert in his calcu-
lation of a reasonable jury award or a maximum reasonable jury
shown to exceed "any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be
based upon the evidence before the jury." Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390, 413 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831, 88 S. Ct. 100, 19 L.Ed.2d 90 (1967).
Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869, 871 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). See, eg., Kelly v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 552 F. Supp. 399, 401 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
121. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
122. See Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168, 1187
(W.D. Wis. 1982) (court determined "as a matter of law that $10,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $15,000 in punitive damages is reasonable"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167
(7th Cir. 1983); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[a]s a
guideline in determining how much of the verdict is excessive, the court adopts the approach
favored by Professor Moore, Le., the excess over the amount the court believes a properly
functioning jury should have found"). See also Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F.
Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court merely sets a figure without applying any standard),
aff'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983).
123. See, eg., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 1985);
Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984); Sam's Style
Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982); Warren v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F.
Supp. 1195, 1206 (D. Md. 1985); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 463 (E.D.
Tex. 1985); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1055, 1068 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Dick v.
Wantowan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 (D. Minn. 1983); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Schreffier v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp.
1300, 1309 (D. Del. 1981); Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214,
218 (D.S.D. 1977); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Md. 1975).
124. See, eg., Dick v. Wantowan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 (D. Minn. 1983);
Morgan v. Consol. Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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award. 125 In many cases, the trial judge states the standard to be
applied in assessing the amount to be remitted, and then, without
revealing the analysis behind his decision, conclusively states that
on the basis of the stated standard, no reasonable jury could have
awarded more than $X, and, thus, the plaintiff must remit the
amount by which the actual jury verdict exceeds $X. 126 Again, a
distinction should be made in regard to "liquidated amount cases"
in which the court is always very explicit as to the exact calcula-
tions and arguments necessary to reach $X, the appropriately sized
verdict. 127
Once the trial court determines how much should be remitted in
order for a new trial order on the grounds of excessiveness, the
court will enter some sort of conditional new trial order, with the
denial of a new trial on the ground of excessiveness being condi-
tioned on the plaintiff's agreement to remit the amount calculated
by the court. 128 The courts have uniformly held that the plaintiff
must be given the opportunity to elect between a new trial and a
remittitur-reduced verdict.' 29 Even if the trial judge is convinced
that the only problem with the entire trial process was the excessive
enthusiasm of the jury in calculating damages, and that he has pre-
cisely calculated the correct damages (a never-never land possibil-
ity), the trial judge cannot simply enter the remittitur-reduced
verdict as a final verdict; the trial judge must leave the choice be-
tween reduced verdict and new trial to the plaintiff.
This limitation on the trial judge must, however, be distin-
guished from his authority to "correct" or "mold" a verdict where
the correct verdict is correct.13 0  Such power should probably be
125. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
127. See cases cited supra note 117.
128. See supra note 14 for a description of conditional new trial orders.
129. See, e.g., McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391 (7th Cir. 1984); Fenner
v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983); Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400,
405 (2d Cir. 1983).
130. See Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 F.R.D. 48, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (motion to mold
verdict). See also Eastern Assoc. Coal v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 475 F. Supp. 586, 593-
94 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (if amount of error is definite, "the court is of the opinion that the matter
can be handled by a reduction of judgment pursuant to Rule 50(b) .... instead of following
the cumbersome route of the remittitur resulting possibly in a lengthy retrial of the whole
case"), rev'd on other grounds 632 F.2d 1068 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1980). Cf
Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note 15, at 390 (suggesting that remittitur is constiu-
tional in "liquidated amount" cases but possibly not constitutional in cases involving unliqui-
dated amounts or uncertain measures of damages).
Under Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court judge has the
power to correct a jury verdict to make the verdict consistent with interrogatories. This
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used in all cases in which an identifiable error (such as an incorrect
jury instruction) has led to the inclusion in the verdict of an errone-
ous amount.' 31 Remittitur is not necessary where a clear error can
be corrected by "molding" the verdict; in those cases, the plaintiff
should not be given the power to force a new trial.
132
When the trial judge makes a conditional new trial order, he can
order a total new trial133 or can limit the new trial to certain issues,
usually damages.1 34 A partial new trial is often ordered when the
trial judge feels that the jury decision in regard to liability is correct
and the only problem with the verdict is in the valuation of dam-
ages.135 Then, if the plaintiff refuses to remit, he is only subjected to
a partial new trial. Thus, judgment in his favor would be assured,
with only the amount of damages to be relitigated 1 3
6
Conditional partial new trial orders appear to be an economical
response to circumstances in which a trial judge is convinced that
the only defect in a trial was that the jury awarded excessive dam-
ages. Such orders, however, might actually lead to judicial waste; a
plaintiff who is assured of a judgment in his favor might not view a
new trial as a particularly risky proposition. Thus, he might reject a
reasonable remittitur order and opt for a new trial, if he feels that
the reduced verdict is a little too small. 137
After the conditional new trial order is entered, the plaintiff is
given a certain number of days in which to affirmatively agree to the
power, coupled with locally recognized authority to "mold" jury verdicts, should provide a
method for resolving "liquidated amount" cases without resorting to remittitur. See supra
notes 117-18 and accompanying text, text accompanying note 127, infra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 178-79. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
131. See supra cases cited in note 117.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82 and 258-61.
133. See generally supra note 14.
134. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509
F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally supra note 14 (citing cases in which the
defendant's new trial motion is granted conditioned on the plaintiff's subsequent refusal to
remit excess).
135. See, eg., Harper, 563 F. Supp. at 585; Morgan, 509 F. Supp. at 288. See also Proler
v. Modem Equip. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1388, 1393-94 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (The judge stated that he
could grant a limited new trial or grant a remittitur option; the judge denounced the option
and ordered an absolute new trial only on the issue of damages).
136. A partial new trial procedure might lead to judicial waste by encouraging plaintiffs
to seek unrealistically high damages or engage in improper trial tactics on the theory that an
excessive verdict will probably only lead to a remittitur or a partial new trial on damages.
The plaintiff's prize, a finding of liability against the defendant, will not be put at risk.
137. See supra note 136, infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text, and text accompany-
ing notes 250-52.
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remittitur. 131 If he rejects the remittitur or if he is silent, the new
trial is automatically ordered. At that point, neither party can ap-
peal because a new trial will be conducted. 139 After the new trial
terminates in a final judgment, the plaintiff can appeal the original
trial judge's new trial order as well as raise any other objections that
he has.14" The defendant also might appeal if dissatisfied with the
outcome.
If the plaintiff agrees to the remittitur, the trial judge enters a
final judgment in the remittitur-reduced amount. 141 After years of
debate in lower federal courts,' 42 the Supreme Court decided, in
138. See supra note 14.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1948 & Supp. 1987) (provides, in part, that "[t]he Courts of Ap-
peals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States .... " If a trial judge orders a new trial, he does not enter a judgment pursuant
to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and his order is not deemed "final." See
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, "34 (1980) (an order granting a new trial is
not immediately appealable because of its interlocutory nature; a party seeking a writ of man-
damus must have no other means of relief; thus a trial court order for a new trial which is
reviewable on a direct appeal after a final judgement has been entered rarely will justify issu-
ance of the writ). See generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE
L.J. 539 (1932) (an appeal can be taken only from a final judgement; an underlying policy is
that it is the only way in which the appellate courts can prevent themselves from being inun-
dated with appeals).
140. See, e.g., Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980);
cases cited in 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2818, 115
nn. 41-42 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1987).
141. See supra note 14.
142. As of 1977, the Fifth Circuit had adopted a procedure, contrary to a traditionally
observed prohibition of remitting plaintiff appeals, of permitting such a plaintiff to remit and
still appeal the conditional new trial order so long as he remitted "under protest," thereby
giving notice of the possibility of an appeal. See, eg., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco
R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); Bonura v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir.
1974), reh. and reh. en banc denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d
857 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970);
Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), modified, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972);
Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). The Sixth Circuit
had also permitted remitting plaintiff appeals, but under a state law which the court had
followed. See, e.g., Howard v. J.W. Zellner & Sons Transfer Co., 539 F.2d 244 (6th Cir.
1976); Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976); Burnett v. Coleman Co.,
507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir.
1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973); Mooney v. Henderson Portion
Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). Other circuits had not adopted the procedure, although
the First Circuit assumed, in dictum, that "an appeal lies from a consented-to remittitur,"
Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l. Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit
had reviewed the Fifth Circuit procedure but had reserved the decision on whether to employ
the procedure until faced "squarely" with the issue, Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr.
Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1975), and the Third Circuit had narrowly avoided the
issue when a district court accepted a remittitur "under protest," the court of appeals revers-
ing and remanding on other grounds. Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171
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1977 in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.,' 43 that plaintiffs who had
agreed to remit could not appeal the trial court's conditional new
trial order, even if the plaintiffs remitted "under protest."'" Ac-
cording to the view adopted by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff,
who has reaped the benefits of the remittitur procedure by avoiding
a new trial cannot question the propriety of the conditional new
trial order from which he has benefited.145 The defendant, on the
other hand, can appeal the trial court's grant of a remittitur, argu-
ing that he should have had the new trial, his right to which had
been tacitly recognized by the order of the conditional new trial.
But for the availability of remittitur, the defendant might argue, the
trial judge would have granted a new trial on the ground of exces-
siveness of the jury verdict. 146 Moreover, the defendant often con-
tends that the defects in the trial which culminated in the excessive
verdict were not curable by remittitur in that the errors might have
affected the jury's decision on the issue of liability as well as
amount. 47 Some defendants will argue, in the alternative, that the
remittitur ordered by the trial court was too small. 148
At the appellate level, the remitting plaintiff has nothing to gain;
he does, however, have something to lose. While the plaintiff must
(E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973). The Seventh Circuit
had expressly disapproved the Fifth Circuit approach in a direct appeal case, Collum v. But-
ler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970), and had felt compelled to dismiss a remitting plaintiff's
cross-appeal on the basis of precedent. Shor-line Rambler, Inc. v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 543 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1976), The Eighth Circuit also rejected the Fifth Circuit proce-
dure, Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 491 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 505 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
143. 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam).
144. Id. at 649. The Court stated, "[iln order to clarify whatever uncertainty might exist,
we now reaffirm the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal court ... may not appeal from
a remittitur order he has accepted." Id. at 650. The Court also rejected Sixth Circuit reli-
ance on state law, stating that "[t]he proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal
system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is ... a matter of federal law." Id. at 649.
145. Id.
146. See, eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 12-13; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at
672.
147. In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984), the de-
fendants had appealed from a remittitur reduced verdict, 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
arguing that the verdict was still excessive and that they should be granted a new trial or an
increased remittitur. The court concluded that "use of remittitur deprived the defendants of
their right to a jury trial on the issue of pecuniary loss" and remanded for a new trial on that
issue. 742 F.2d at 47. See also Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1986);
Gardino v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1979); Durant v. Surety
Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1978); Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
577 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1978).
148. See, eg., Knight, 786 F.2d at 1298; Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at 47; Gardino, 587 F.2d
at 206; Durant, 582 F.2d at 1087.
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remain mute, the defendant can attack the remittitur-reduced
award.149 The result might be the new trial that the plaintiff sought
to avoid by agreeing to the remittitur at the trial level150 or a condi-
tional new trial order by the appellate court, with grant of a new
trial being conditioned on the plaintiff's refusal to remit an addi-
tional amount set by the court of appeals.15 1 In other words, at the
appellate level the plaintiff can again be asked to relinquish part of
his verdict or submit to a new trial on some or all issues.
The question of the power of an appellate court to order a remit-
titur has plagued the federal judicial system since the remittitur pro-
cedure was first employed by federal courts.152 In fact, in Blunt v.
Little, 5 3 Mr. Justice Story was sitting as a circuit court judge when
he announced his approval of remittitur and ordered the plaintiff to
remit $500 or submit to a new trial.' 54  Federal courts have been
slow to adopt the procedure, 155 and commentators have expressed
disapproval of appellate remittitur on a variety of grounds, includ-
ing, difficulty, on the basis of a trial record, of identifying an appro-
priate case for remittitur,5 6 and calculating the amount to be
remitted, 15 the inequity of giving the defendant another opportu-
nity to reduce the plaintiff's verdict, 58 and the potential seventh
amendment objection that appellate court judges would be making
a remote reexamination of an issue decided by a jury.159 This has
149. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 147-48.
150. See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984)
(court of appeals orders new trial on damage issue excepting pre-impact pain and suffering
award rather than accepting remittitur because of prejudicial errors at trial).
151. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984) (district court
had requried remittitur for part of punitive damage award, court of appeals requires remitti-
tur of part of compensatory damage award); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1978) (district court had required remittitur of certain elements of compensatory
damages, court of appeals remands for additional remittitur or new trial).
152. See Busch, supra note 15, at 550; Hullverson, Remittitur and Other Things, 28 J.
Mo. B. 81, 98 (Feb. 1972); Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310-11; Comment,
Appellate Remittitur, supra note 15, at 644.
153. 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.A. Mass. 1822).
154. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1955). Accord Ballard v.
Forbes, 208 F.2d 883, 888 (Ist Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586-87 (7th Cir.
1952); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 837-38 (10th Cir. 1951).
156. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310; Comment, Appellate Remittitur,
supra note 15, at 643-44.
157. See Hullverson, supra note 152, at 98 (noting the problems juries and judges face
when trying to determine the present value of awards designed to compensate for future
losses).
158. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310.
159. Id.; Comment, Appellate Remittitur, supra note 15, at 643-44. See also Busch, supra
note 15, at 550 (suggesting appellate remittitur is neither justified nor necessary for affirming
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not stopped federal appellate courts from adopting and employing
the practice in a wide variety of situations. 6 ' Recognizing the ob-
jections raised above, some appellate judges apply a more rigorous
standard to the grant of appellate remittitur than the standard they
recognize as appropriate for a trialjudge. 16' Otherjudges, however,
do not evidence any sensitivity to their limited role on appeal, hack-
ing away at jury verdicts (or trial court remittitur-reduced verdicts)
that they consider excessive. 6
If the court of appeals decides that a remittitur should be or-
dered, the plaintiff is again put to the choice of remittitur or new
trial on some or all issues.1 63 If he agrees to appellate remittitur,
what is left of his verdict is probably safe because of the unlikeli-
hood that the Supreme Court will entertain the defendant's petition
for a writ of certiorari."
Finally, if the trial judge denies the defendant's new trial and/or
remittitur motions, judgment will be entered on the jury verdict.
Then both parties would be free to appeal and the defendant could
seek, and receive, a remittitur at the appellate level. 165
a verdict. If a verdict is clearly improper, reversal and remand for a new trial on all the issues
or damages only is appropriate).
160. See, ag., Enterprise Ref. Co. v. Secter Ref., Inc., 781 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986); Joan
W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1985); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l
Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir. 1985); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d
821 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Everett v. S.H. Parks & Assocs., 697 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1983). See
also supra notes 158-59.
161. In Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit stated:
This court has noted repeatedly that the excessiveness of a verdict is basically an
issue for the trial court, and that we consider review only in those rare situations
where we are pressed to conclude that there is a plain injustice, or a monstrous or
shocking result.
Ial at 197. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir.
1984); Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869, 871 (lst Cir. 1982); Warren v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082,
1088 (8th Cir. 1981).
162. See, eg., American Andoco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417, 425 (6th
Cir. 1984); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 93 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1982); Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348,
1351 (8th Cir. 1979).
163. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d at 425; Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601
F.2d at 1355.
164. Except for its three page, per curiam treatment of the "remittitur under protest"
issue in Donovan, see supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text, the court has not considered
remittitur since its dictum in Dimick, see supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
165. E.g., Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 302.
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
III. EVALUATION OF REMITTITUR PRACTICE
Hundreds of recent federal court cases involving remittiturs and
scores of articles and other secondary sources were consulted in the
preparation of this Article.166 About ten years ago, a flurry of inter-
est in remittitur arose from the then-current federal court conflict
concerning whether a plaintiff should be allowed to remit "under
protest" and then appeal the remittitur order.167 The Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion in Donovan put an end to the conflict
when it "reaffirm[ed] the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal
court, whether prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may
not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted." 16 The "long
standing rule" reaffirmed in Donovan was based on four Supreme
Court decisions, rendered between 1889 and 1917,169 which courts
and commentators felt did not constitute compelling precedent for
rejection of the "remittitur under protest" procedure.17 0
Since this brief flare-up of interest in remittitur, which ended
shortly after the Donovan case, the Supreme Court has not dealt
with remittitur practice and commentators have also been silent on
the subject. The federal courts, however, have been most enthusias-
tic in their employment of the device (sans the "remittitur under
protest" protection for plaintiffs), engaging in wholesale, unfettered
use of remittitur both at the trial and appellate levels.1 71 While the
frequency of remittitur's use varies from circuit to circuit, there has
been an observable proliferation of remittitur cases in recent years.
This is partly ascribable to remittitur's use in an ever-widening vari-
ety of cases in which money damages might be awarded and partly
ascribable to an increase in the number of actions in which remitti-
tur traditionally has been employed-personal injury suits involving
pain and suffering and other "incalculable" sorts of damages such
as loss of services, of consortium, of counsel, of companionship, and
the like. As constantly improving technology has created new and
different ways in which ever-increasing numbers of people can suffer
personal injury and death, medical science has improved apace, in-
166. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 15 and cases cited supra in notes 31, 111, 117,
and 160.
167. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
168. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam).
169. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver
Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Kennon v. Gilmer,
131 U.S. 22 (1889).
170. See, e.g., Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 313-15; Note, Appealability of
Judgements, supra note 15, at 1155-61.
171. See cases cited supra notes 31 and 160.
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creasing the probability that seriously injured people, people who
would have died under more primitive conditions, will survive to
face a life of pain, suffering and diminished capabilities. The prob-
lem of determining an appropriate measure of damages in such
cases continues to plague courts and juries, with the frequent result
that a jury verdict for such intangible losses is considered excessive
by the trial or appellate court-a candidate for remittitur.
The remittitur procedure, as employed in federal courts, is un-
fair and does not achieve the desired ends-economies of time and
money-which have repeatedly been cited to justify the proce-
dure. 172 In fact, remittitur practice appears to encourage a certain
type of waste173 and to create circumstances in which the result will
necessarily be a~n excessive verdict.' 74 To determine what corrective
measures should be employed, one must first evaluate current pro-
cedure17 5 and then propose alternative procedures to better achieve
the underlying purposes of remittitur without the detrimental side
effects of the current practice.
176
A. Current Remittitur Practice
As noted above, 17 7 serious doubts have been expressed as to the
constitutionality of remittitur practice in light of the seventh
amendment's proscription of reexamination of facts found by a jury
other than as such reexamination was available at the common law.
Moreover, the procedure was overruled in England in 1905,178 thus
requiring that the procedure employed in the United States be ex-
amined closely on grounds other than constitutionality. Even if a
comparable procedure for reexamining jury verdicts existed at the
common law, which would make the use of the procedure by fed-
eral courts not unconstitutional, the rejection of the procedure in
England makes one wonder whether the use of the procedure in the
United States is objectionable for other reasons. Clearly, the Eng-
lish courts found it to be so. Moreover, without persuasive compa-
rable procedures in the country from which the federal system
sprang, compelling reasons should support continuation of the pro-
cedure, reasons which this writer cannot identify. 179
172. See infra notes 177-247 and accompanying text.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 182-88.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
175. See infra notes 177-247 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
178. Watt v. Watt, App. Cas. 115 (1905).
179. See infra notes 180-240 and accompanying text.
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Traditionally, defendants have viewed remittitur as an unfair
procedure. By ordering a conditional new trial, the trial judge (or
the appellate judge) recognizes that something went wrong at trial,
resulting in an excessive verdict. Rather than giving the defendant
the new trial to which he admittedly would be entitled if remittitur
practice did not exist, the defendant is told that the judge is going to
try to "fix" the defective verdict by asking the plaintiff to give up
that part of the jury verdict which the judge deems to be exces-
sive.18 If the plaintiff agrees to remit, the defendant is deprived of
the new trial even if the defendant thinks that the reduced verdict is
still too high or that the problem with the verdict indicates a serious
defect in the course of the trial itself.18'
Remittitur may also be viewed as unfair to the defendant if used
in a "liquidated amount case."1 2 If the trial judge can pinpoint the
error at trial and can calculate the amount of damages included in
the verdict as a result of the error,'83 then it is unfair to the defend-
ant to give the plaintiff the option of forcing a new trial. The de-
fendant will argue that the plaintiff should not be permitted to force
an expensive new trial if the only problem with the jury verdict is
the inclusion of an inappropriate element of damages which can be
removed by the judge.
Finally, the defendant might object to a trial court's grant of a
partial rather than total conditional (or unconditional) new trial. If
the new trial order is limited to damages, a plaintiff might be en-
couraged to seek a new trial and refuse to remit; the plaintiff has the
assurance that he risks nothing more than the amount of his verdict
if he opts for a new trial. Moreover, the partial new trial procedure
might encourage plaintiffs to ask for unrealistically high damages in
the hope that the jury will give the plaintiff all that he seeks. The
advantage of this for the plaintiff is the possibility that the trial and
appellate judges might be unwilling to disturb the jury verdict. If
the trial judge or appellate judge does find excessiveness, the judge
will often order a conditional new trial on only the issue of dam-
ages. If the plaintiff is satisfied with the remittitur-reduced verdict,
he can agree to remit. If he is dissatisfied, he is not required to risk
180. See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. The defendant can, of course, ap-
peal the denial of his new trial motion, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the standard employed on that appeal should be stricter than that provided at the trial
court level, thus, in theory, making it harder to get relief in a court of appeals. See supra
notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
183. See cases cited supra note 117.
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his verdict but only the measure of damages to be awarded.184 If no
remittitur practice were available and no partial new trial were pos-
sible, the plaintiff would be constrained to seek realistic damages
because the only option available to the trial judge upon a finding of
excessiveness would be to grant a total new trial on all issues.
A related problem, from the point of view of the defendant (as
well as the judicial system), is that remittitur and partial new trials
encourage plaintiffs to engage in improper trial tactics. The plaintiff
who knows that a remittitur-partial new trial order is a strong possi-
bility, 18 will not be averse to "pulling out all of the stops" to get a
jury verdict because the court is likely to merely slap the plaintiff's
wrist by asking for remittitur of some of the verdict obtained in a
trial marred by misconduct such as improper arguments to the
jury"8 6 or requiring that the plaintiff undergo a new trial only on the
issue of damages.1 7 Again, if the plaintiff knew at the outset of the
trial that the judge's only option, upon finding prejudicial error in
the form of plaintiff misconduct, would be to order a new trial on all
issues, the plaintiff and his attorney would be encouraged to con-
duct their case in a more appropriate manner.188  Misconduct
would be too great a risk to take if the possibility of remittitur and
partial new trial were removed. Thus, from the defendant's point of
view, remittitur can be used to deprive him of a new trial which he
deserves, can lead to expensive new trials at the whim of the plain-
tiff where the defect in the jury verdict could easily be corrected by
the trial judge, and can actually encourage plaintiffs to seek unreal-
istically high damages and engage in improper trial tactics.
The plaintiff also has many reasons for objecting to remittitur
practice. The plaintiff who has gone through the litigation process
and emerged victorious with a verdict in hand would like to retain
his entire verdict. He is told, however, that he must choose between
a new trial or remitting some of his verdict. For many plaintiffs,
this essentially amounts to blackmail, with the verdict being held
hostage. 189
184. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
186. See cases cited supra notes 104-05.
187. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text, and infra text accompanying note
249.
189. Judge Feinberg argued, in his dissent in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d
536, 539 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 648 (1977):
When a remittitur is used..., the coercive effect upon a plaintiff is very great.
He is offered a reduced verdict right away. Should he refuse, in order to regain the
full amount of the verdict he must first undergo the delay and trouble of a second
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For a plaintiff who is old or ill, there is no real choice but to opt
for remittitur if he hopes to receive the fruits of the verdict during
his lifetime. Other plaintiffs who are in difficult financial straits-
for example, those who have suffered disabling injuries and cannot
support themselves or pay medical expenses--can ill afford to wait
until the end of another trial to receive financial benefits. Moreover,
such plaintiffs are not in a position to bear the expense or risk of a
new trial, even if they feel that the remittitur reduced verdict is un-
justly small. Finally, attorneys will pressure these plaintiffs to agree
to remit, partly from a desire to have their fees paid. Very few
plaintiffs are in the enviable position of not feeling pressured into
agreeing to the remittitur. If not deterred by added expense and
time, plaintiffs might still be reluctant to risk another trial, espe-
cially because second trials often result in smaller verdicts19 or in
trial, perhaps obtain a lower verdict, and then try to persuade an appellate court
that the trial judge erred in reducing the first verdict. It should be no surprise that,
as the majority puts it, "most plaintiffs now accept the remittitur thus necessitating
a second trial in only a small minority of cases." If this is so, it proves appellant's
point, which is that the present system deprives him of any real opportunity to
challenge the judge's use of a remittitur.
See also Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 311-13.
The tortuous process which ensues when a plaintiff refuses to remit, what one commenta-
tor refers to as "a potentially permanent treadmill, [with plaintiff] forever winning jury
awards only to have them nullified by the court," Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note
15, at 377-78, is illustrated by some of the cases cited infra notes 190-91. The court in Collins
v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976), noted:
Technically, a remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice which gives plaintiff the option
of a new trial. Such an option is really without much significance. An order of
remittitur is a judicial determination that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law
.... The reality is that if there is a verdict for the plaintiff upon retrial, it cannot
from a pratical standpoint, be expected to be sustained in an amount previously
deemed excessive ....
Id. at 934 (citations omitted).
190. See, Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 912-14 (3d Cir. 1983) (after Trial 1, plaintiff
refused to remit $90,000 of his $150,000 jury award to bring verdict to $60,000; Trial 2
resulted in jury award of $50,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in Trial 1
court's conditional new trial order); Smith v. John Swafford Furniture Co., 614 F.2d 552, 553
(6th Cir. 1980) (after Trial 1, plaintiffs refused to remit amounts necessary to reduce their
jury awards of $44,797 and $9,000 to $27,500 and $5,000 respectively; Trial 2 resulted in jury
awards of $16,000 and $0, respectively; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Ehret
Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1975) (after Trial 1 plaintiff
refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce his jury award of $546,000 to $408,119.25; Trial
2 resulted in jury award of $120,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Reinert-
sen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1975) (after Trial I
plaintiff refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury award of $75,000 to $45,000; Trial 2
resulted in jury award of $16,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Slatton v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505, 506-09 (8th Cir. 1974) (after Trial I plaintiff
refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury award of $85,000 to $50,000; in Trial 2 the
trial court assessed damages of $19,000 less an offset for workmen's compensation benefits;
court of appeals found no abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Holmes v.
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the new trial judge again ordering a remittitur or new trial on the
ground of excessiveness.191 The unfairness of ordering a remittitur
after a second trial is particularly apparent-arguably, the second
judge should defer to the jury since two different juries awarded
damages greater than trial judges deemed appropriate, leading to
the obvious conclusion that the jury verdict should not be
disturbed.
The plaintiff may also raise the argument that remittitur actu-
ally encourages trial judges to interfere with the functioning of the
jury by making relatively minor adjustments to the jury verdict.19 2
The judge may feel that the damages are not so excessive that he
would, in good conscience, order a new trial on that basis. He will
Wack, 464 F.2d 86, 87-89 (10th Cir. 1972) (after Trial 1, plaintiff refused to remit amount
sufficient to reduce jury award of $15,000 to $5,000; Trial 2 resulted in jury award of $0;
court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Cosentino v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 389 F.2d
726, 727 (2d Cir.) (after Trial I plaintiff refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury
award of $25,000 to $13,000; Trial 2 resulted in jury award of $1,800; court of appeals found
no abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). See also Bruner v. Dunaway, 684
F.2d 422, 424-27 (6th Cir.) (Trial 1 resulted in $300,000 jury award for plaintiff, trial court
ordered new trial; Trial 2 resulted in $100,000 award for plaintiff; court of appeals affirmed),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1982). But see Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d
494, 497-501 (8th Cir.) (Trial 1 resulted in $1,000,000 jury award for plaintiff; court of ap-
peals ordered new trial for prejudicial errors at trial; Trial 2 resulted in $2,000,000 award for
plaintiff; court of appeals affirmed), cerL denied, 106 S.Ct. 233 (1985); Vanskike v. Union
Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1148-50 (8th Cir. 1984) (Trial 1 resulted injury award of $903,000,
trial court ordered new trial on damages; Trial 2 resulted injury verdict of $1,811,177; court
of appeals affirmed); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 929-35 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Trial I resulted in verdict for defendant and trial court ordered new trial because verdict was
against weight of the evidence; Trial 2 resulted in award of $600,000 for plaintiff; court of
appeals affirmed).
191. See, Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1210-22
(8th Cir. 1982) (Trial 1 resulted in total jury award of $1,094,000 and court ordered new trial;
Trial 2 resulted in total jury award of $650,000, trial court ordered remittitur down to
$406,978 and plaintiff refused to remit; on petition for mandamus, court of appeals ordered
trial court 2 to reinstate second jury verdict), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1982); Ouachita
Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc, 716 F.2d 485, 487-
90 (8th Cir. 1983) (after Trial 1, plaintiffs refused to remit amounts necessary to reduce their
jury awards of $3,300,000 and $500,000 to $1,312,762.17 and $250,000, respectively; Trial 2
resulted in a verdict for defendant; court of appeals found that remittitur in Trial 1 might be
too large and vacated and remanded for reconsideration; court of appeals reconsidered the
appeal en banc and concluded that the damage award should not have been less than
$1,808,547.67 and then remanded to the district court); Richardson v. Communication
Workers of Am., 530 F.2d 126, 128-30 (8th Cir. 1976) (Trial 1 resulted in finding of wrongful
discharge and damages of $20,000 which was reduced to $1,500 by trial judge, court of ap-
peals ordered new trial limited to damages; Trial 2 resulted in damages of $92,000 for loss of
employment and $250,000 for "mental anguish"; district court granted new trial on "mental
anguish" claim because it found the verdict punitive; Trial 3 resulted in finding for defendant
on "mental anguish" claim; court of appeals affirmed).
192. See cases cited supra note 116.
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feel less constrained about ordering a new trial conditioned on the
plaintiff's refusal to remit a small amount of his award. The judge
knows that the plaintiff will probably remit and bring the award
exactly in line with the amount that the trial judge feels is the "cor-
rect" verdict.
The Donovan decision 193 has exacerbated the unfair position in
which the plaintiff perceives himself. According to the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff, who has benefited from the remittitur by having
the new trial cancelled, cannot be so ungracious as to appeal the
trial court's conditional new trial order.194 Thus, the remitting
plaintiff, who probably views himself as a victim of the judicial sys-
tem because his election to remit rather than suffer a new trial is not
really voluntary, is forced to remain mute at the appellate level
while the defendant is free to challenge the denial of his new trial
motion or to argue that the amount of the remittitur was too
small. 95 If the court of appeals grants the defendant's motion for a
new trial, the plaintiff's hard fought battle is lost, and he must sub-
mit to a new trial. 96 Moreover, he faces the substantial risk that
the court of appeals will ask him to remit more of his verdict or
submit to a new trial. 197
Plaintiffs could also raise legitimate objections to the procedures
federal courts use in determining when remittitur is appropriate and
calculating the amount to be remitted. Moreover, the entire federal
judicial system may be compromised by the remittitur procedure as
currently employed in many courts. Even if a form of remittitur
were available at the common law, so that the seventh amendment
arguments would not prevail to invalidate the entire procedure, the
"wholesale" remittitur practiced in federal courts seems to exceed
permissible bounds. Arguably, at the common law, a judge had the
power to "correct" an excessive jury verdict or to order new trials
on the ground of excessiveness. 98 His power did not extend, how-
ever, to substituting his own evaluation of the facts adduced at trial
for that of the jury. A federal trial judge is not given such power in
other contexts. He cannot, for example, grant a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the basis of insufficiency of evidence; he
193. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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must grant a new trial.199 When a trial judge orders remittitur on a
factual rather than legal basis, he is substituting his own evaluation
of the facts for that of the jury. The plaintiff does, of course, have
the option to refuse to remit and thus elect a new trial; thus the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict analogy is not complete.
When one considers, however, the unrealistic nature of any expecta-
tion plaintiff will opt for a new trial-most plaintiffs have no real
choice but to remit-the analogy becomes more apt.
To assess circumstances in which trial judges (and appellate
judges) grant remittitur and the procedures they use to determine
the amounts to be remitted, the cases should be examined by cate-
gory. Clearly, some of the most astonishing results occur in per-
sonal injury and wrongful death cases in which the jury is required
to evaluate past and future pain and suffering, as well as future
financial and personal loss because of the continuing effect of the
injury. The judge often maintains that, due to his exposure to simi-
lar personal injury cases, he is well-equipped to determine what
should be the maximum allowable jury verdict.2" He and his col-
leagues within a particular circuit have sat on many "lost limb"
cases, for example, and he will assert that a jury verdict which ex-
ceeds the largest prior verdict for such a loss is "too large" and
should be reduced, if not to equal the average of such past ver-
dicts,2 0 1 or the highest of such past verdicts20 2 then to some "rea-
sonable" increment above the highest prior verdict (thus allowing
for some usually undefined "fudge" factor).2 "3 Such a mathemati-
cal and mechanical approach to evaluation of damages completely
undercuts the function of the jury which is to decide how much this
199. See supra note 10.
200. See generally Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Martell v. Boardwalk
Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98
(N.D. Ill. 1984); Villar v. Wilco Truck Rentals, 627 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. La. 1986); Gaston v.
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Williams v. Ryder Truck
Lines, 489 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
201. See, eg., Martell, 748 F.2d at 740; Williams, 489 F. Supp. at 430; Smith, 608 F.
Supp. at 458.
202. See, eg., In re Air Crash, 767 F.2d at 1151; Gaston, 487 F. Supp. at 16.
203. See, Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[w]e believe
the jury could rationally award damages to Joan above the record $60,000 figure . . .[;
a]ccordingly, we hold the damages excessive only to the extent they exceed $75,000); Haley v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[because] $150,000 ap-
pears to be a relatively large, if not the largest, damage award for loss of an adult child in
Louisiana, the maximum that we think a reasonable jury could have awarded . . .was
$200,000 ($150,000 plus an additional one third)").
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particular plaintiff has suffered and will suffer in the future because
of the injury. 2" The judge uses his prior experience to round off the
comers and adjust the verdict so that it is in line with a judicial
preconception of what a particular type of injury is worth. The ef-
fect of this approach is almost the same as if trial judges provided
juries with "schedules" of allowable ranges of recovery for particu-
lar types of injuries, much like the schedule provided with most lia-
bility insurance policies.
Such an approach clearly usurps the function of the jury. The
fact that the trial judge has seen, in his years on the bench, human
misery of different types, might make him a particularly poor candi-
date for the task of assessing damages in a particular case. Argua-
bly, after a while, he may become unable to see the cases as
involving unique individuals but rather as fact situations to be fit
into a scheme of prior cases. Jury members, on the other hand, do
not come to a case prejudiced by earlier courtroom experiences but
rather view the case as a unique event in which they evaluate loss
based on their own experiences of the real world and their own as-
sessments of the peculiar circumstances of the plaintiff at bar. On
the ground that this is the role traditionally ascribed to the jury,20 5
a trial judge's reassessment based on other cases should not be
countenanced.
The arrogance displayed by courts in these types of cases is par-
ticularly galling. One need review only a couple of cases to be able
to identify with these feelings.206 In a recent decision in the Fifth
204. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text, and infra notes 218-20 and accompa-
nying text.
206. See Joan W, 771 F.2d at 1023-25 (civil rights action for recovery for emotional
damage caused by strip search; court compared verdicts in other cases arising from same
police procedure and required remittitur down to $75,000, which was $15,000 more than
largest prior verdict); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 318-19 (5th Cir.
1984) (wrongful death action for death of 25 year old son of plaintiffs; court agreed with
defendant's contention that verdict of $350,000 for each parent was "by far the largest quan-
tum of damages awarded the parents of an adult offspring in Louisiana jurisprudence" and,
on the basis of prior decisions, required remittitur down to $200,000 each, one-third higher
than highest amount previously awarded); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp.
98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (wrongful death action for death of husband of plaintiff;
"[c]onsidering the evidence at trial and other awards in similar cases, the Court is of the
opinion that a remittitur of $1,000,000 is appropriate"); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp.,
487 F. Supp. 16, 18-19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (products liability action involving permanent pa-
ralysis of plaintiff; court reviewed awards in other similar cases and concluded that the ver-
dict of $1,250,000 was "out of line with the verdict in other cases.. .[; a] reasonable verdict
and one in line with other cases... would be $1,000,000"); Williams v. Ryder Truck Lines,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (personal injury action involving disabilitating
back injury; the court found it "obvious ... that the $250,000.00 verdict for Mr. Williams
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Circuit, for example, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans,
Louisiana, 1 7 a case in which an aircraft had crashed into the plain-
tiff's home, killing his wife and three children, and destroying his
house and its contents, the jury had awarded the plaintiff, inter alia,
$400,000 for the loss of each child and $1,500,000 for the loss of his
wife. The District Court had obtained the plaintiff's agreement to a
remittitur of $500,000 for the loss of his wife. In reviewing the re-
maining damage award which it found to be excessive, the Court of
Appeals "examine[d] past awards for similar injuries," "[f]or what
rough guidance they provide."20 8 The Court of Appeals did allow
that "simply because certain awards have been affirmed does not
indicate that these are the highest, or even near the highest, awards
which might be allowed."2 9 With no analysis other than notation
of the results of several recent cases, however, the court
concluded: 210
We find that $500,000 for the loss of love and affection of the
wife and $250,000 for the loss of love and affection of each child
are the maximum amounts which may be awarded in this case.
We reach this conclusion first and foremost on the evidence in
this record, and secondarily on the rough guidance provided by
awards approved for similar injuries by the Louisiana appellate
courts and the decisions of this court applying Louisiana law.
The court did not explain how the "evidence in the record"
prompted its conclusion that "on the facts of this case, these are the
[was] out of line with the verdicts and awards in similar cases in this Court"). See also infra
notes 207-21 and accompanying text. Cf Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742,
750-52 (W.D. La. 1983) (products liaility case; court downplays "comparison" test in favor of
determining whether the jury verdict, which was higher than a number of awards in similar
cases, "[did] not exceed the maximum amount allowable under the evidence adduced at
trial"). In one recent wrongful death action, the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb a jury ver-
dict which was the "largest published award for the surviving parents of an adult child,"
concluding that they were "very reluctant to substitute [their] views on damages for those of
the jury ... ." Guiterrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1985). This case
demonstrates surprising restraint by the court which seemed so free to interfere with large
verdicts against airlines, see In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151
(5th Cir. 1985) (described infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text); Haley, 746 F.2d 311,
318-19 (5th Cir. 1984), making one wonder about the source of the inconsistency in ap-
proach.
At least one circuit has gone so far as to express regret that no awards in similar cases
were available for comparison purposes. In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 296
(7th Cir. 1979), the judges noted that they "would be more comfortable in deciding the amor-
phous question before us.. .[in favor of affirming the jury verdict] if other courts had ap-
proved comparable awards."
207. 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985).
208. Id. at 1156.
209. Id. (emphasis in original).
210. Id. at 1157.
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maximum awards which may be sustained." '211 The reader is left to
guess at the court's analysis. Did the Court of Appeals reduce the
amounts because the record revealed that the defendant did not love
his family very much and thus would not suffer too much from their
loss? Or, on the other hand, did the court believe that, with no
children to raise by himself, the plaintiff would not suffer the loss of
his wife too keenly? Did the court reduce the per child damages
because there were three children, so the plaintiff might have valued
each less than if he had only one child? Of course, such specula-
tions seem ghoulish and unfair, but with nothing more to go on
than conclusory statements that the record will support no more
than these amounts, any precedential value of the case is reduced to
merely a recital of maximum allowable amounts to be quoted as
"rough guidance" by a trial or appellate judge in the next similar
case. The jury, not having to answer uncomfortable questions like
those posed above, is better equipped to calculate damages in this
case. Jurors do not compare the plaintiff here to other people
whose spouses have died in accidents; jurors decide what damages
this plaintiff suffered in this tragic event which wiped out his entire
personal life. Comparisons are inappropriate unless the cases are
quite comparable, and such identity does not occur.212
The Second Circuit also engaged in a comparison process as
part of its analysis in concluding that a $2,000,000 jury verdict for a
teenage boy who lost an arm in a boating accident was excessive
and should be reduced to $1,200,000.213 The court noted:
211. Id. (emphasis in orginal).
212. Judge Tate, in his dissenting opinion, argued:
In short-hand terms, the fundamental error of the majority is its failure to recog-
nize that, as a threshold matter, the award of damages is essentially a factual deter-
mination by the trier of fact under the particularized facts of each case-not a
matter that on appellate review is to be scaled as allowable by a trier of fact only by
the use of numbers derived from prior appellate approval of awards for losses of
wives and children that were made under varying factual conditions; not as if the
loss of a wife or the loss of a child represents some kind of a fungible loss to be
measured interchangeably, so that the loss of any wife is the same as the loss of any
other wife under all circumstances.
Essentially, it is only after an appellate court determines that an award is exces-
sive under federal standards of appellate review, that utilization of past awards may
become relevant in determining the amount to which a jury award should be re-
duced, for remittitur purposes, as the greatest amount awardable under the circum-
stances. Here, in effect, the majority determines that the present awards for the
plaintiff's loss of his entire family, his wife and three little boys, is excessive-with-
out reviewing the particular circumstances of the present loss-essentially because it
is greater than any award found reported in federal or state appellate decisions that
had approved a particular trial jury's award of lower damages for loss of a wife or a
child (under circumstances, however, that differ markedly from the present).
Id. at 1160.
213. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 1984).
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[T]he guidance we receive from the recent New York cases is
that the awards condoned for the loss of a single limb have
ranged from $325,000 to $810,000. The award to Brent of
$2,000,000, if designed principally to compensate him for the loss
of his arm and his other physical injuries must be considered to
be at least twice as high as what is permissible.2 14
In this case the court did compare the facts to other cases, conclud-
ing that this plaintiff had not suffered such extreme loss as the other
plaintiffs. Again, however, this rather clinical approach, taken by
an appellate court which was remote from the trial process in which
the jury participated and on which it based its decision, seems inap-
propriate. Either the jury should be able to decide each case on its
own merits, or trial judges should require the jury to review prior
cases. In many recent personal injury cases, judges seem to use the
jury merely to decide questions of liability with the judges deciding
the questions of unliquidated damages by themselves.2 15
Not all judges are willing to use remittitur to reduce jury ver-
dicts so that the amount awarded is more consistent with the results
of other similar cases in the jurisdiction. At least one District Court
granted a new trial on the ground that the excessiveness of the jury
verdict when compared with other verdicts reflected "undue sympa-
thy of the jury toward the plaintiff. 21 6 The court, finding that the
jury had been improperly biased in favor of the plaintiff, required a
new trial, concluding that "[i]f a jury verdict results from passion or
prejudice, the proper remedy is a new trial and not remittitur."21 7
While noting this disagreeable practice by many federal court
judges, it is only fair to observe that other judges have respected the
jury as the body with which responsibility for these difficult damage
decisions should rest. After denying a remittitur in Milos v. Sea-
Land Service, Inc., Judge Irving Ben Cooper of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York presented
strong arguments for respecting the unique function of the jury:
[]e must take great care to avoid an "unjustified usurpation of
the function of the jury," especially where clear issues of fact
appear in the trial record and ample evidence exists to support
the verdict.
In the last analysis, we see overwhelming support for the ob-
servation (in essence) of Mr. Justice Holmes: that the life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience. It is exactly that
"experience" which brought the jury system into its very exist-
214. Id. at 753.
215. Id.
216. Villar v. Wilco Truck Rentals, 627 F. Supp. 389, 392 (M.D. La. 1986).
217. Id. at 392. See also supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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ence; and it was the jury's "experience" which resulted in the
verdict herein recorded and now under attack. 18
In a recent case, McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that
"[p]lacing a value on human suffering is always a subjective enter-
prise, turning on the jury's sensibilities to the facts and circum-
stances presented in a particular case."'2 19 Finally, in defense of the
district court's decision to refuse remittitur from a verdict of
$19,000,000, the court gave homage to the jury system: 20
It is not for me to say that a jury's assessment of unliquidated
damages is wrong because I would have arrived at a different
figure. Indeed, the constant exposure to death, injury and out-
rage which confronts judges necessarily jades our vision and im-
mures our emotions. The genius of the jury system is the
deliverance of judgment by collective response from members of
the community who have ordinary experience.
Unless the Supreme Court steps in to set guidelines for remitti-
tur cases such as those discussed above,22' the dichotomy in ap-
proaches will persist, to the detriment of the parties involved in
litigation and the judicial system as a whole. If the federal courts
are not permitted to dispense with juries in these cases, the First
Circuit's sentiments will, indeed, be pertinent-assessment of incal-
culable, intangible damages is a function best left for the jury.222 If
the jury errs and awards damages which would be excessive as a
matter of law, then a new trial with a properly functioning jury
should be granted.
In addition to the objectionable practice of trial and appellate
judges using the remittitur device to second guess juries in areas in
which no definite amount or even ballpark figure can be identified
with any degree of certainty, many judges who base their remittitur
orders on the "facts of the case" employ a clinical approach which
is offensive and unjust. Often, complete dissection of a portion of
the damage award (on the basis of the facts of the case) is coupled
with a completely conclusory analysis of another aspect of damages.
The offensiveness of the "clinical approach" lies in the tendency of
trial and appellate court judges to make inappropriate inferences
from the facts at trial. The court, for example, might conclude that
218. 478 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985) (Tate, J., dissenting); supra note 208.
219. 724 F.2d 243, 247 (Ist Cir. 1984).
220. Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (D. Colo. 1985).
221. See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
210 [Vol. 38:157
REMITTITURS (AND ADDITURS)
a small amount of damages or no damages at all should be awarded
to a spouse for loss of consortium, affection, companionship, and
guidance, based not on the fact that the evidence at trial established
that the spouse did not have an affectionate or physical relationship
prior to the tragic event in question, rather on the fact that the
couple was in their later years at the time of the injury.22 3 While it
is a reasonable inference that some older couples are less frequently
physically intimate than some younger couples, it is equally possible
that dependence on one another for the satisfaction of physical and
emotional needs can grow during a marriage with the later years
being the ones in which the spouses are most needful of one an-
other's companionship as well as physical love. Again, this is not
the sort of inference that a judge ought to be making; if the facts at
trial could lead to more than one conclusion as to the value of an
element of damages, the jury should make the choice. Judges are
too often influenced by stereotypes of prior decisions to be effective
in the microscopic examination of a single case where a fair damage
assessment is essential.224
Another less than subtle form of age discrimination evidenced
by judges examining jury verdicts appears in the area of damages
for pain and suffering, past and future.2 25 While everyone recog-
nizes that the life span of an older person is statistically less than
that of a younger person, leading to the conclusion that the future
223. In Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d
473 (4th Cir. 1986), a personal injury case involving a 60 year old plaintiff, the court stated:
Moreover, $180,000 for loss of consortium is likewise grossly excessive. Plain-
tiffs did not even seek damages for loss or impairment of the sexual relationship
between plaintiff Holman and his wife, and the jury was expressly instructed not to
consider this element in deciding upon the amount to be awarded for loss of consor-
tium. In view of the ages of both plaintiff Holman and his wife, this Court con-
cludes that on the record here an award in the amount of $180,000 was likewise
grossly excessive.
224. See, eg., supra note 206.
225. In Holman, 610 F. Supp. at 1205, the court concluded that the damage award of
$1,300,000 for pain and suffering of a 60 year old man was "grossly excessive." The court
noted:
In opposing the motion of defendant Patuxent for a partial new trial, plaintiffs
have cited numerous cases in which substantial awards in excess of $1,000,000 have
been upheld on appeal. However, almost all of the cases cited by the plaintiffs in-
volve a plaintiff who was much younger at the time of the injury than plaintiff
Holman. Indeed, in most of these cases, the plaintiff was a child, a teenager, or a
person in his 20's or 30's with a much greater life expectancy than J.C. Holman.
Id. In Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), a products
liability case in which the plainitff contracted mercury poisoning from the defendant's skin
cream, the court seemed, in part, to base its decision to grant a new trial on the issue of
damages on the fact that the plaintiff was 84 years old and already suffered from other physi-
cal ailments.
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pain and suffering of an older person will probably be of shorter
duration than that of a younger person, an older person still suffers
pain. Moreover, older people have redfuced physical capabilities in
terms of recovery and will be condemned to live out their lives with
little hope of relief from pain and disability. A younger person will
heal more completely, will possibly benefit from future medical
breakthroughs, and is usually surrounded by a supportive family
structure. Often, the older person is alone. Again, the jury seems
better equipped to evaluate all of these factors in a particular case to
reach a just result. The court, in ordering a remittitur, usually fo-
cuses only on the age of the plaintiff, finding that an older plaintiff is
entitled to a much smaller recovery than a similarly situated
younger plaintiff."2 6 These "clinical approach" problems not only
arise in circumstances involving apparent age discrimination by
trial judges, but also problems will arise in any circumstance in
which a judge will have a stereotypical reaction based on a particu-
lar fact of the case, such as age, sex, social status, educational back-
ground, or the like.
A different but no less frustrating approach taken by some
courts in calculating remittiturs is the "conclusory statement" tech-
nique. The court will usually outline the facts of the case rather
carefully and will describe, in detail, the requirements for grant of a
remittitur and the other circumstances in which the court had made
such orders. Then, without further discussion, the court will an-
nounce its conclusion that the verdict is too high and that a certain
remittitur will reduce the verdict to a permissible level.227 Hodges v.
Keystone Shipping Co. provides a representative sample:
The Court concludes that the jury verdict was not the result of
passion or prejudice but is beyond the maximum award sup-
ported by the evidence. The Court finds that the evidence
presented could support a maximum award of no more than
$12,500. The Court therefore grants defendant's motion for new
trial on the issue of the amount of compensatory damages unless
plaintiff accepts remittitur of the compensatory damages to
$12,500.22
8
In such cases, the parties and the appellate court have no clue
226. See supra notes 222 and 224.
227. See, e.g., Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982)
("[c]onsidering all relevant evidence, we conclude that the punitive damages award exceeds
the [standard and] . . . find $20,000 to be the maximum allowable recovery for punitive
damages in this case . . . and order a conditional remittitur to that amount"); Hodges v.
Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (quoted in text supra note
225).
228. 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
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how the court reached its decision. In effect, the trial judge be-
comes a jury of one, rendering a general verdict, with no responsi-
bility to explain the basis for this verdict.229 This sets the trial judge
up as an alternative to the jury, an alternative who might, at any
time, substitute his own conclusion for that of the jury.
Another objection that plaintiffs might raise to current use of
remittitur is the frequency with which the device is used in cases
involving relatively new causes of action, such as proceedings for
sexual harrassment, employment discrimination, violation of civil
rights, and the like.23 It is obvious that, where a right to relief has
only recently been recognized or adopted, there will be few cases in
which the right has been vindicated. Thus, damage assessment
must be created along with the other parameters of the cause of
action. The courts, however, seem reluctant to allow juries the free-
dom to formulate damage awards. Instead, the courts freely em-
ploy remittitur to adjust jury awards downwards, even though
where there are no prior awards in similar cases the trial judge has
very little on which to base a remittitur. Again, these awards
should be left to the jury to determine on the basis of the facts of the
case and the jury's collective assessment of the damages suffered by
plaintiff in this new kind of civil wrong.
Finally, the party who sought the jury trial at the outset of liti-
gation, as required by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,2 31 can legitimately object to the use of remittitur by the trial
or appellate courts. In the federal courts in cases in which a trial by
jury is available, one of the parties must demand a jury trial or the
case will be tried by a judge without a jury.2 32 The party demand-
229. If a federal judge sits without a jury, the court is required to "find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon ... " FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Thus, a trial
judge who grants a remittitur without sufficiently explaining the steps by which he reached
the result is "having it both ways"--because of the presence of a jury he is not required to
comply with Rule 52(a) and explain himself, but because of the power to grant a remittitur he
can substitue his own evalaution of damages for that of the jury, essentially cutting the jury
out of the process.
230. See, eg., Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (remitti-
tur in suit for violation of civil rights by wrongful arrest); Huebschen v. Department of
Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d
1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (remittitur in suit for wrongful conception).
231. Rule 38(b) provides:
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right
by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefore in writing at any
time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the
service of the last pleading directed to such issue ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (b).
232. Rule 38(d) provides:
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ing the jury trial can argue that his demand implied a desire to have
questions of fact be decided by a jury and not by the trial judge.
When the trial judge orders a remittitur or new trial, the judge must
substitute his own evaluation of the evidence-at least he must sub-
stitute what he thought a properly functioning jury would have
awarded-for that of the jury.2 33 This is not what the party seeking
a jury trial had in mind; he bore the additional expense and delay of
the jury trial to reap the benefits of having factual issues decided by
the jury and not according to what the judge thought the jury ought
to have found. If the party is the plaintiff, he will argue that the
amount of the jury verdict should not be disturbed-he asked for a
jury and this is what the jury awarded him. If the party is the de-
fendant, he will maintain that he is entitled to a new trial before a
new jury-he asked that questions of fact be decided by a jury, and
if this jury made some serious error, then he should be entitled ab-
solutely to have the question presented to a new jury. As noted
above, 2 34 in a system in which some trial and appellate judges use
the remittitur device to run "rough shod" over the jury findings,
such objections can be supported. The party who opted to have his
questions presented to a jury should not have those questions de-
cided by a judge-something he specifically wanted to avoid.
Aside from the interests of either party, remittitur can be viewed
as a procedure which, contrary to the justifications usually given for
it, encourages waste of judicial time and energy. As noted above,235
if remittitur is used in a case in which the trial court is convinced, as
a matter of law, as to the source of error which lead to an improp-
erly high verdict and as to the amount of the verdict traceable to
that error, remittitur is a wasteful method for dealing with the er-
ror. The plaintiff has the option to force a whole new trial even
though the trial judge would not have questioned the amount of the
verdict except for the existence of this particular error. If the error
is plain to all and the amount is identifiable, the plaintiff should not
be able to force a new trial in order to try to retain an erroneously
awarded sum.
Remittitur is also wasteful because a defendant, who has little to
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and
to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 38(d).
Rule 39(b) provides that "[i]ssues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38
shall be trial by the court.. .", FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b).
233. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 197-214 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 117 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 181-82.
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lose by the process, will ask for a remittitur routinely. This wastes
judicial time by requiring the trial judge to rule on these motions.
Although the defendant might not want to undergo the expense of a
new trial himself, especially where the verdict is not outrageously
large or is even quite reasonable, he bears little risk by asking for a
remittitur. The trial judge might deny the motion and the defend-
ant is left where he started. If the trial judge grants a remittitur, it
is almost a foregone conclusion that the plaintiff will opt for the
remittitur rather than the new trial.236 In either case, the trial judge
will be required to rule on the motion and, if he decides to grant a
remittitur, he will be required to determine the appropriate amount
of damages. Thus, the system encourages judicial waste by provid-
ing almost no detriment for a defendant seeking a remittitur. If the
defendant were required to accept the verdict or submit to a new
trial, he would be less inclined to challenge the verdict on the
ground of excessiveness. Thus, challenges would be reduced to
those cases in which the defendant was convinced of the merits of
his motion.
A related source of judicial waste in the remittitur procedure is
the requirement that the plaintiff consent to remittitur.237 The trial
judge must spend time in calculating the appropriate verdict, but
this time will be wasted if the plaintiff opts for a new trial.
An additional source of judicial waste is the effect, noted above,
of the current system in encouraging plaintiffs to seek unrealistically
high damages238 and to engage in improper trial tactics.239 Such
actions by the plaintiff lead to more post-trial activity in the form of
remittitur and new trial motions. If the plaintiff were forced to sub-
mit to a new trial when the jury awarded unrealistically high dam-
ages, or if the trial process involved plaintiff misconduct, the
plaintiff would be encouraged to seek only realistic damages and
conduct the trial in a more appropriate manner. Again, much judi-
cial time would be saved.
As noted above, remittitur also encourages trial courts to alter
jury verdicts2" when, if the only choice available to the courts
would be to grant a new trial on the ground of excessiveness, the
court would feel constrained from doing so. The case would have
236. Cf supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
237. Cf. supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 116 and text accompanying note 188.
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to be rather compelling before a new trial would be ordered. Again,
judicial waste would be avoided.
Overall, it is difficult to conclude that remittitur, as currently
used, is a valuable procedure in the federal courts. Any time and
effort saved by avoiding new trials is arguably overshadowed by the
wasteful effects noted above. Moreover, the procedure is perceived
by each party as unfair and results, in many cases, in a wholesale
substitution of a trial judge's evaluation of the facts for that of the
jury. Even if the procedure is constitutional, alternative procedures
should be adopted in the federal courts.
Before proposing alternatives, this Article will identify an area
in which remittitur seems to serve a useful function so that pro-
posed schemes will provide for that circumstance. In many recent
cases, federal courts have used remittitur to reduce punitive dam-
ages to an acceptable level, while attempting to avoid the necessity
of a new trial.24' Punitive damages are not intended to compensate
the injured plaintiff for the damages he has suffered; they are in-
tended to punish the defendant and deter him and others from fu-
ture wrongful conduct.242 Thus, the measure of damages, unless set
241. See, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1635
(1986); Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (1lth Cir. 1983); Fact Concerts, Inc.
v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir.), vacated, 453 U.S. 247 (1980) (on grounds that
municipality is immune from award of punitive damages); Douglas v. Hustler Magazine, 607
F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Il1. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (appellate court noting in
dicta that the remittance was improper because the financial position of defendant justified
jury's award), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp.
318 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
182 (1985); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 785 F.2d 849
(10th Cir.) (evidence insufficient to support award of punitive damages), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 457 (1986); Walden v. United States Steel Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
modified, 759 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1985); Brinks' Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jack-
son Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 83 F.R.D. 41 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F.
Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
242. In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois stated the function to be served by punitive damages as follows:
Punitive damages are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence . . . . If a jury award exceeds the amount required to serve the two
objectives of punishment and deterrence, the Court must reject it .... Damages
should not go beyond deterrence and become a windfall .... Therefore, it is impor-
tant that courts exercise control over excessive awards.
Douglas v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citations omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986). A
district court sitting in Colorado articulated the Tenth Circuit's "formula" for assessing puni-
tive damages:
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter simi-
lar conduct in the future and by others .... Several factors must be taken into
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by statute, relates to the deterrent effect of such awards. If punitive
damages are too small, the defendant might find it economically
reasonable to continue committing the offensive behavior.243 If pu-
nitive damages are too high, the defendant will be put out of busi-
ness.244  The correct measure of such damages depends on the
defendant's assets. In many cases courts have required that the
plaintiff remit part of punitive damage awards to bring such awards
in line with the defendant's ability to pay. While ability to pay and
deterrent effects arguably are questions of fact, a judge who finds
that the punitive damages awarded by a jury far exceed the defend-
consideration in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive:
(1) whether it bears some reasonable relation to the actual damages awarded; (2) the
degree of malice involved; (3) the gravity of the plaintiff's injury; (4) the desire for
meaningful punishment .... [Tihere is no precise mathetmatical ratio for determin-
ing the reasonableness of the punitive damage award. However, it has been held in
the Tenth Circuit that an award of punitives can be "[s]o extremely disproportional
that we must assume that the jury acted either with passion or prejudice .... "
Dearmore v. Gold, 400 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1968). In the Dearmore case, a ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages of 11:1 was struck down as being excessive.
Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 40 (D. Colo. 1983) (citations omitted), rev'd on
other grounds, 785 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986).
243. In finding a $500,000 award for punitive damages not excessive, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan noted this possibility:
Once it decided that punitive damages should be assessed to punish defendant and
deter others, the jury could properly consider, as plaintiff argued, the multi-billion-
dollar financial resources of defendant .... The size of an award which is necessary
to make General Motors Corporation take steps to discharge its legal responsibili-
ties, rather than be regarded as an inconvenient cost of doing business, is clearly a
judgment call.
Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen'l Motors Corp., 575 F. Supp. 12, 17 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(citations omitted), modified, 739 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (statements concerning the con-
sideration of defendant's financial resources in fixing the amount of punitive damages, how-
ever, were proper), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985). In a sex harrassment suit, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia also raised similar considerations in its
assessment of punitive damages awarded by the jury:
Punitive damages are allowable to punish defendant for the nature of his conduct
and as a deterrent to others .... The jury could reasonably have believed that, in
view of the considerable wealth of the defendant corporation, it, and others simi-
larly situated, would not be motivated to prevent a recurrence of incidents such as
those shown by the evidence to have occurred in this instance unless a substantial
verdict was returned.
Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305, 310, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 31,385, at 18,292 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980).
244. In Hollins v. Powell, the court sought a remittitur of punitive damages against a
person who had lost his job and was "under severe financial constraint" from $500,000 to
$2,000 on the following theory:
We can see neither the justice nor sense in affirming a verdict which cannot possibly
be satisfied. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish Powell for outrageous
conduct, not to drain him of his life's blood.... We believe an award of $2,000
would serve the purpose of punishing Powell for his callous indifference to the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and also satisfy the deterrent purpose of punitive
damges, over and above that provided by the compensatory damage award.
773 F.2d 191, 198 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1635 (1986).
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ant's ability to pay, and orders a remittitur, is acting not as a
factfinder (assets and ability to pay are facts usually not in dispute)
but rather as a protector of the legal function to be served by puni-
tive damages. In other words, while compensatory damages are
clearly a matter for the jury where the relevant facts are the plain-
tiff's injuries, punitive damages remain more within the province of
the judge, with the relevant facts being the defendant's financial
condition. The law should recognize that the defendant legiti-
mately can be "wiped out" by compensatory damages245 but should
not recognize or sanction such effect from punitive dan. eS. 2 4 6 A
new trial on the basis of excessive punitive damages wL not result
in different factfinding-the defendant's wealth, a. objective
amount, will remain the same. Excessive punitive damages is one
area in which the trial judge can use the device of remittitur to
avoid an essentially useless new trial. The jury's factfinding is not
being overridden; the court is merely correcting damages, which as
a matter of law are too high. 24 7 However, even this useful and rela-
tively inoffensive remittitur procedure contains the seeds for judicial
waste. The plaintiff can combat the use of this device by rejecting
the remittitur and insisting upon a new trial. Clearly, a better ap-
proach is required.
B. Remittitur Reform
First, as noted above,248 additur is probably no less constitu-
tional than remittitur, and an additur-type procedure should be
available to plaintiffs to the same extent that a remittitur-type pro-
cedure is available to defendants. Any alternative scheme to pres-
ent conditional new trial practice should include both types of
procedures.
This writer has concluded that remittitur, in its present form,
should be eliminated as a procedural device. Without the availabil-
ity of remittitur, plaintiffs would be constrained to be more respon-
sible in their original requests for damages and in the conduct of
their trials.249 A plaintiff would know that if he sought excessive
damages and the jury awarded the damages sought, the trial court
would have to grant a new trial upon finding the damage award
245. Compensatory damages depend on the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff
for his injuries. The defendant's ability to pay should not be relevant to this inquiry.
246. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
247. See cases cited supra note 241.
248. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
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excessive. The plaintiff would be forced to consider carefully the
appropriate measure of damages to which he is entitled. If the un-
availability of remittitur were coupled with a refusal to grant partial
new trials on damage issues alone, plaintiffs would soon learn that
excessive greed will result only in a waste of money, time and effort
on a new trial. The plaintiff also runs the risk that a second jury
will find for the defendant rather than him. With the result, being
more reasonable demands for relief, the federal judicial system
would be greatly relieved of the unreasonable, escalating damage
demands now being requested in a large percentage of our jury tri-
als. Moreover, fewer trials would result in excessive damage
awards, thus necessitating fewer new trials and new trial motions,
and relieving the federal system of the burden of these additional
trials and motions.
Without remittitur, and without partial new trial, the plaintiff
would learn that inflammatory trial tactics designed to maximize
the amount awarded by the jury and performed in flagrant disre-
gard for the appropriate conduct of a civil case would result in a
new trial rather than an inflated jury verdict which could then be
reduced by the trial judge using remittitur when necessary.250
Again, the plaintiff who engaged in such tactics would be putting
his entire verdict at risk. Not only would the trial process become
more orderly and proper, but the occasion for prejudicial error at
trial would be reduced.
Elimination of current remittitur practice would also serve the
salutary function of checking trial and appellate courts in their un-
fettered tampering with jury verdicts.251 With the grant of a new
trial (the only option if the trial court found the jury verdict exces-
sive) judges would not second guess the jury unless the verdict were
truly excessive. Whereas some trial judges have no compunction
about seeking a remittitur of ten or fifteen percent 252 (a circum-
stance in which the plaintiff will almost certainly remit rather than
submit to a new trial), they probably would not grant an uncondi-
tional new trial in the same circumstances. Thus, new trials would
be limited to cases in which damages were clearly excessive and a
lot of "tinkering" with jury verdicts by trial and appellate courts
would be eliminated. Judicial time would be saved because the
courts would not have to calculate remittiturs and enter remittitur
orders and new trials would occur only in the more extreme cases.
250. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 197-233 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
2191987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the judge would not be substituting his own opinion for
that of the jury.
Trial and appellate judges also would not be engaging in whole-
sale reexamination of jury verdicts. Where the verdict is clearly ex-
cessive, a new trial with a new jury would be allowed. The judge
would not be required to spend time calculating the exact amount
of the excessiveness. Much of the chaotic state of the law, occa-
sioned by the varying standards applied by courts, would be mini-
mized. Moreover, any problem of the judge substituting his own
factual evaluation for that of the jury would be eliminated.253
Clearly, the judge would be unable to save a jury verdict by "lop-
ping off the excrescence." In cases in which the verdict is clearly
excessive and the source of error is unidentifiable, however, strong
arguments have always been made that the defendant should be en-
titled to a new trial.254
Elimination of remittitur would also provide a more balanced
appeals process. If the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for
a new trial on the ground of excessiveness, the defendant could im-
mediately appeal that denial and the plaintiff could defend his
award. If the trial judge granted a new trial because of an excessive
verdict, neither party could appeal until the end of the new trial.
Thus, the inequitable situation created by the Donovan case in
which the remitting plaintiff was not being permitted to appeal
would be eliminated. 5
Finally, both parties would probably feel more fairly treated. If
the defendant were told that the judge could not support the verdict
because it was too high, he would be granted a new trial. The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, would not be faced with the difficult choice
of a reduced verdict or new trial-no real choice for many plaintiffs.
The plaintiff who prefered to avoid a new trial would know that
new trial orders would not be granted unless it was clearly
warranted.
Elimination of current remittitur practice would not necessarily
mean that every case in which the jury verdict was found excessive
would lead to a new trial. A suggested alternative would be that
subsequent to the finding of excessiveness, the parties be given the
option to agree on a smaller verdict-a form of post-trial settle-
ment. The parties could determine what amount would be fair
253. See supra notes 197-233 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
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without relying on suggestions from the trial judge (thus avoiding
the time required to make that evaluation). The trial judge would
have the option to review the new verdict, but he would not be re-
quired to do so, because, if both parties have agreed to the amount,
neither would be in a position to enter a motion for a new trial.
This procedure would be useful if both parties wished to avoid the
expense and delay of a new trial. Moreover, the new verdict could
not be viewed as a substitution of the judge's fact-finding for that of
the jury.
Such a procedure could also be made available in an additur-
type situation in which the trial judge grants a new trial on the
grounds of inadequacy of the jury verdict.256 Instead of being
forced to submit to a new trial, as is now the case because additur is
not permitted in federal courts,257 the parties could agree to an in-
creased verdict and avoid a new trial.
Elimination of current remittitur practice would not mean that
a "liquidated amount case" would have to be submitted to a new
jury. 5 Under Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court has the power, when it has sought from the jury a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, to enter
judgment in accordance with the answers to the interrogatories
"[w]hen the answers are consistent with each other but one or more
is inconsistent with the general verdict ... "2"9 Moreover, the trial
judge has always had the power to "mold" the jury's verdict in con-
formity with the jury's findings and to correct obvious errors in the
verdict itself.26 0 Thus, if the trial judge is certain that there is an
error in the jury verdict and can readily determine the amount of
money which is traceable to that error, he should have the power to
correct the verdict without remittitur or additur. Conversely, the
plaintiff should not have the power to force a new trial if the error
in the jury verdict can be identified and rectified.261 Trial judges
should be encouraged to seek special verdicts or general verdicts
with interrogatories in order to identify and correct calculable jury
errors and avoid unnecessary new trials.
Punitive damages could be handled in several ways; they could
256. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 56-90 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 127; notes
130 and 132 and accompanying text; and text accompanying notes 181-82.
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
260. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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be treated as "liquidated amount cases" with the trial judge setting
the amount of damages.262 Or perhaps it would be more satisfac-
tory to view the measure of punitive damages as a question of law to
be resolved by the trial judge based on the jury's findings on the
amount of the defendant's assets, his ability to pay and his prior
record as an offender.263 Punitive damages calculations also could
be handled by a formula determined by the courts or by Congress.
An alternative to the total elimination of remittitur practice
would be to allow trial judges, at the time of submitting a case to
the jury, to suggest upper and lower limits of permissible verdicts.
This procedure, however, would require a tremendous effort on the
part of the trial judge as he would have to assess each case before
submitting it to the jury. Moreover, it might seriously compromise
the function of the jury by giving them "ball park" figures.
CONCLUSION
Any attempt to standardize the remittitur procedure would be
so difficult and would so seriously undermine the function of the
jury that one would have to conclude that the work of the jury
should be left to the jury, and that when the process misfires, a new
trial should be granted. After all, because of the unavailability of
additur in federal courts, the federal courts have been following the
new trial procedures outlined above, and the system has not
collapsed.
262. See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
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